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CBAPTD 1 
SmowtY 
~ a result ot this thesis, it could be concluded 
that lonc ter. treads caa be predicted with a greater degree 
of reliability thaa short ter. treads. ~11 the indicators 
studied aad fOUDd reliable should be viewed as a croup. ~ 
dec isioa to prrchue stocks should be aade as a result ot a 
aa~ority of the indicators becoaiac bullish. The opposite 
woald hold true for selliDI stocks. 
Soae indicators chaaae directions at various times 
duriD& the cycle. 'ftlere is a paUem to the sipals given 
by the iDdicatore during each CJCle. Of coarse, this pattern 
is not ricid by any aeaae. The usual order of indicators 
becoaing bullish would be the followinc: The Yield Cycle 
indicator usually is the first to siiDal that a new ball aar-
ket sheuld be anticipated. ~ hip Short Interest Ratio is 
aaother indicator to watch dariDI the early etaaes of a bull 
aarket. The next croup of incUcatore to IIOVe would be the 
Odd Lot Indicators - Odd Lot TradiDI Ratto, Odd Lot Balaace 
Index, aad the Odd Lot Short Sales Iadex, alonc with the 
Free Credit Balaaces. The Debit Balances tend to live a 
sipal closer to the actual rise. The ~dvance-Decliae Line 
&hes Us sipal ~ast after the start of the advance. The 
Hiib·Low Index contimas the bull market a short tiae after 
the start of the rise. Tbe Low Price Stock Index is a real 
1 
lal&ia& iadicator because it doea uot live its siggal uatil 
the bull .at.ket is well oa ita way; bat 1D order tor a bull 
aarket to be iD effect, this 1Ddex has to becoae bullish. 
The uaaal sequeace of iDdtcators turaiDI beariah 
2 
ia the tollowiDI: The Yield CJCle ia the first to liTe an 
iadicatioa that a decline ia ~iDent. The Low Priced Stock 
Iadex is the next indicator to tar.a bearish. The Free Credit 
Bal .. ces aad AdY&DCe-DecliDe Liue tara dowaward shortl7 attar-
ward. The Odd Lot Indicator• are cuato.ari17 aext to tura 
bearish. ~e Debit Balaacea call the tara closer to the ac-
tual start ot the decliae. 
The reader .ust realize that the tiaetable is a 
flexible aae; therefore, all the indicators haTe to be fol-
lowed. 
CJUPTD II 
INTRODUCTION 
~ person aust set aside a .. fftctent aaoaat of ttae 
reJQlarly each week in order to saccessfully invest his sur-
plus funds in equities for future appreciation. Investing 
should be coasidered a second vocation becauae of the amount 
of tiae oae aust devote to it. The avera,e investor believes 
that he caa .ate money in the stock market without expending 
aach tiae or effort. If he succeeds, it is only a aatter of 
luck. What he fails to realtH is that. ll&kia& aoaey in the 
stock market is just as difficult, if aot aore so, as earninl 
a liviD& in his own occupation; therefore, he will have to 
spead a 1reat deal of tlae on his investments if his stock 
aarket activities are to consistently increase his aet worth. 
For eDIIple: aa iadivtdual would not dream of haphazardly 
placinl his firm's tands into an investment on the recommen-
dation of a security sale .... without investigatiag the 
BdYisability of the purchase. 
Fa!daaptal .+.palnis 
There are two baste aethods used by professionals, 
as .well as amateurs, ia analyziDI stocks and the stock aarket. 
The first, aad aost widely lalOWD, is the fundaaental approach., 
FUDdaaental analysis varies froa si~le to caaplex methods 
of evaluatin& the value of a stock. Stock prices only infre-
quently coincide with the calculations of stock values no 
matter how painstakingly they are fo~lated. Decisions to 
buy and sell shoald not be based on fundamental analysis 
alone. Stock prices are influenced by various psychological 
factors and by speculative attaapts to exploit the wide 
cyclical swings and even the shorter flactaations. 
While fundaaental analysis is essential, the jus-
tification of its forecast aay take a lon1 time. Meaa.hile, 
the nerves of stockholders are sabjected to aauy strains 
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and stresses. Moreover, if investors are guided solely by 
valaes, they .ay reaain oat of the .arket darin1 the most 
profitable period of rise and re-enter it long before the down 
trend is reversed. 
Technical +p•ll!is 
The second approach is the method of evaluating 
-
stock market alternatives by technical analysis. This 
thesis will deal with a segment of this broad area. The 
technical analyst is mainly conceraed with a picture of what 
has happened in the past to the stock's price. This picture 
is found on a chart Which depicts a recent history of the 
advances and declines in the price that the public is well-
ing to pay for the stock. The technical analyst reasons 
that the public has already analyzed the tatare potential of 
the stock and that the stock market has already discounted 
thsse facts in advance. He also ases charts of indexes of 
the stock market as a whole to point the direction in Which 
the market will 10. Technical aaalysis or the stock market 
as a whole will be the area developed in this thesis. 
PUrpose ot Jh!!is 
The main question to be answered in this thesis 
is: Are there any !took market indicators that the inve!tor 
caa compile without placiD& too areat a burden on hi•selt 
aad which will live him saae iasight as to which way the 
market is headed? ODe should realize that each indicator 
alone is ot very limited value, but they are useful as a 
aroap combined with the knowledie obtained by the fundamen-
tal analysis or the particular stock. The combined analysis 
is invaluable in tor.ing a deciaion as when to purchase 
stocks, and ~ast as important, when to sell the equity. 
There are a great .auy financial services, based 
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on tecbDical aaalysis, published to live the investor intor-
matioa as to what the stock .arket is 10in1 to do next. They 
deal in short term trends, inter.ediate trends and primary 
or lon1 term trends. These services base their predictions 
on several indexes or a group of indexes plotted on charts. 
Most of these services are aaturally expensive for the aver-
&18 investor. Most services do aot incorporate all the use-
tal and proven indicators that tbe investor will need. 1 There-
fore, if he wiahes to compile several charts in his spare ti•e• 
l!u exception to this statement should be pointed oat. 
The Indicator Digest of Palisades Park, New Jersey does use 
most of the popular indicators. 
(the aore the beUer), he should be able to do so. He will 
be able to use these charts to pia liD insi&h't into the 
direction of the stock market. 
Me!hod Of ly!1q&Sion 
This thesis will atteapt to evaluate the perfo~ 
aace of several indicators and their ae!hod of co.pata!ion. 
The criteria tor aa acceptable indicator are that it should 
be able to predict or confira with a high degree or accuracy 
She future course or trend of the stock market aad do so in 
enn&h U• to be able So take &lh'utage ot the aoveaent. 
It s~oald be coapiled froa iofor.atioa that is readily avail-
able to the averaea iavestor. The inforaation should lend 
itself to ploU iDe oa a chart. 
Siace the stock aarket has beea recula!ed, there 
is a ereas deal of into~tion as So the breakdown of She 
Sraasac!ions at She stock excbaa1es. Maay of the indicators 
available today were not available before re,mla!ion which 
aakes it iapoasible to tell bow they would have worked before 
the "Bil Crash" of 1929. The •ia source of information that 
is available was ud is pablhhed by !he Dow. Joaes COIBp&Dy 
in !heir two tiae and co.pleh pabUcaUoas The 1!11 Ute•* 
Jogmal ud Banop' •· These pabUcaUone will be ay chief 
tource of data for !be various iDdicatort. I will also u•• 
!be .any pablicatioae relati•& to the technical approach for 
theory behilld the .indicator•. 
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PgbUc. OpJJiiOP 
· Indicators should not be Tiewed as aa easy way to 
1et rich quick. lfarly people llaTe the aiscoocept ion that aay-
oae who.uses techDical iodicatora is in the cateaory of a 
aa.bler. This is a very harsh ~-~eat. The indicators 
referred to throughout this thesis are used in aa atteapt 
7 
to define the tread of the urket troa its daily ups aad downs. 
Maay ti.es through the use of the iadicators an insiaht into 
the future direction of the aarket .ay be obtained before 
the public realizes what is happeniac or about to happea. 
What is ep Ip41cttot? 
AD iotroductiOD of this sub~ect would not be comp-
lete without a definition of aa iDdicator. The dictionary 
defiaes aa iDdicatoi as "aa iutra~~eat which indicates the 
coocliUGD". J'or the purpose of this thesis, aa uner to the 
afore.eationed question would be: aa indicator is a deTice 
which aeasures or aamaes·the actual condition of the aa:rket 
as a whole. 
flp!s of Ipdicators 
Just as there are several trends to the market 
aoveaeats, there are also indicators to point out the direc-
tion of each of these aoT~ents. The three types of aoveaeots 
attributed to the .arket are the prillary or loaa tera tread. 
Thiw tread usually lasts for a period of years. The iater-
aediate or secondary treDd. Thia tread lasts for a period of 
several aoaths. ~ last tread is the daily fluctuatioas. 
The thesis will aot include this type of indicator. The 
most. co.plete description of daily indicators is given in a 
book wriUe~ by Joseph 1. Gruville, titled ".&. Strategy af 
Daily Stock Market TimiD& for IIIU:ilmll Profit". 
De pow 'l)!!u . 
The aost famous indicator of all, The Dow Theory, 
is not incorporated in this thesis. The reasons tor its 
omission are that The Dow Theory is not really a definite 
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set of rules for &DJOae to follow. It was interpreted from 
Cbarles Dow's editorials ia the Jt!l Street JogJDal. The 
matter of interpretation of one maa's work by aaother lives 
rise to some of the interpreter's opinion beiD& incorporated· 
into the ori11Dal tenets. Iaterpretin& The Dow Theory is au 
art rather thau a science ead, therefore, you are 1oiag to 
have almost as many opinions as to what The Dow Theory is 
sa.yia& as aen who interpret it. Dow never intended his "Theory" 
to be used as a stock aarket toreca.auaa device. The oriliDal. 
purpose of The Dow Theory was to predict the direction of 
business. In fact, when Charles Dow realized that his edi· 
torials were beta&. used as a speculative device, he published 
his editorials oa the stock market at areater intervals. The 
final reason is that The Dow Theory really does not work that 
well. The Dow Theory gives its bull market siaaal after the 
prices have risea about one third of the way and &ives a bear 
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aarke~ si10a1 af~er ~he prices haTe declined about one ~hird 
of ~he wa7. Thus 7011 pin ouly ~he aid4le tllird of each bull 
aarke~. Iu a s~ua,. wri~~en on s~ock aarke~ forecasters2, 1~ 
wa. brou&ht o~ tha~ b7 follOWiDI ~he editorials of William 
Pe~er Haa1l~ou3 tor a period fraa 1903 to 1929, aa inTes~or 
would haTe realized a ~welTe per cen~ annual re~urn on his 
oriainal inTestaen~; bat it he had jus~ boulbt the s~ocks 
in ~he Dow Joaes !Tera1e aad held ~hea until 1929, he would 
haTe realized a seTen~een per cent aauual rate ot re~urn. 
Indicator• ly!lpaled 
The lhes~s will be concerned with the followiDI 
indicators: the CUaulatiTe AdTaace-Decltne Line, ~he Hilh-
Low Index, the Short Interest Batio, the Low-Priced Stock 
Index, the Yield CJOle, the Odd Lot TradiDI Ratio, the Odd 
Lot Balance Index, the rree Credit Balaaces, the Debit 
BalllllCie!, Ten Week Modified lining ATera,e, Barron's Confi-
dence Iadex, the Odd Lot Short Sales Index, the Scrap Steel 
Indicator, aud the InTeutor7/Sales Ballo. Char~• of each 
indicator haTe been compiled aad appear in the appendix. The 
author i! indebted to Garfield Drew for his charts oa the 
Odd Lot Indicators, to Indicator Di1est tor their Composi~e 
Indicator Index Chan, laTentoJT/Sales BaUo, and chan of 
2Alfred Cowles III, eef 'JJ!' Mtrtet Forecasters 
fOEfC!ft?, (loono.etrtca, Jal7, 9 • 
31ditor of tb• Jfll '*f•·a ~~ after Dow's death aud one of the oo.P ers o t eeor7. 
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Barroa'a Coafideace lades tor 1962, 8Dd to Barroa'a tor the 
Scrap Steel Iadtcator. The r ... iader ot the charts appear-
tag iD the appeadi~ were ploUed by the author hom iaforma-
Uoa giTea iD the "JII'arket LabOratory secUoa" ot Bang' a ud 
the Sgrver of CgrJ!Dt Butipeat published by the Depart•eat of 
c_.rce. 
Qbjeq!&ye ![ Jb!•t• 
Tke ult~te objeciiTe of !his !heat• is to aaewer 
!he quet!iOD posed ia !he !i!le. Tbia will be doue by pro-
Tidilll !he c~siUou of each iDdex, the !heor:r behiDd wh;r 
the iadtcator should torecu• ta'*are !readt ia !he stock 
.. rket, the ,... pertor.aace of '*he iDdicator, aud the coD• 
claaious u to the rela•tve wor'*h ot !he tadtca!or bued on 
ita put Md possible future predtouua. All iadtcator that 
hu beeD reliable iD the pu! .. ,. Dot be wortll aray!hiDI ••• 
!tae iD !be future. The reuon for !hi! 11 !hat !he predic-
t ioD of the tu•ure is bued 11p011 what happesaed after !he ta-
dicator challgod direction ia '*be put. SOlie aew factor may 
arise which .a:r reader !he iadica!or useless. Ano'*her factor 
to coaa14er is that !iDee iDdtca!ora are baaed on llts•ory, 
a ataUar •ev•ea! .. Y occur atier each type of chu1e ia the 
1Ddicator, ba:! ao sequence has enr beea exactly the •••· 
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CJU.PTD III 
PRIJURY LOBG TDII llfDICATOBS 
4 pri .. ry tread is a flow of stock prices jouraey-
iag ia oae directioa tor a lODI period of tt.e. The tiae 
spaa tor a priaary tread is usaally six aoaths to seTeral 
years. Tbe daily fluctuatioas 10 both with the lODI tema 
tread ud apiast the 10111 tem head. The priaary tread is 
iaterrupted occasioaally by iatezaediate treads wbich 10 aaatnst 
the pri .. ry tread. If BD iateJ:II8diate tread penetrates the 
lowest poiat of the pri•ry t:ratl, a new priaary tread is 
coasidered to be established iD the opposite direction. 
The first objectiTe of aay aarket BDalyst is to 
att .. pi to identify a change ia the .. rket's priaary trend 
as quickly aa possible. The aost oosUy mistake that oaa be 
aade ia prediotiDI the aoTODeata of the stock aarket is to 
error iD the recOJDitioa of a priaary tread. 
Priaary iadicatora siiDal the start and culmination 
of the loa1 tera tread. The usual aequeace is for the iadi-
cators to change directioa oae at a tlae and at different 
tiae interTala. After the first iadicator changes direction 
and sianala a reTersal or the current tread, the tiae has 
c•e to be cautious and to watch for trouble to be siJD&led 
by the other iadicators. This policy should be maiataiaed 
antil either the first iDdicator aOTes back with the trend or 
the other indicators are &iTiDI the s .. e rOTersal BiiDal. The 
eventual valid signal will coae atter the accumulation of 
si,ns on the bullish or bearish side. Traditionally they 
give their sigDal and it stays in effect for a period of 
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many monthll or years. Whea eaoagh indicators denote a cha,11.1e 
in direction 1D the prilll&ry tread, then 1t is time to lll&k:e 
your parcbases or sales. 
In order for tec~ical analysis of ~ trends in 
the stock market to be effective, the decisions to initiate 
transactions .ust be .ade without the traits of hope and greed 
influencing :roar decisions.~ 
The following are the leag term indicators that 
the thesis will aUapt to nalaate: The .A.dTance-DecliDe 
Line, the High-Low Index, the Short Interest Ratio, the Low-
Priced Stock Index, the Yield OJCle, the Odd Lot Trading 
Ratto, the Odd Lot Balance Index, the Odd Lot Short Sales 
Index, the Free Credit Balances, and the Debit Balances. 
The analysts of how well these indicators have 
performed dur1D1 the past can not possibly be free from the 
influences of htn~ilht. The author has tried to eliminate 
hindsight as mach as possible by picking up every movement 
that cauld possibly be considered a sigoal and relating 
it to how well the indicator called the turn in the direction 
of the .arket. 
4Auother common weakness that must be overcome 
is pride of one's own opinion. 
CBAPTD I:t 
ADVANOE-D2CLIXE LIKE 
Backu'9!" 
Tbe Advaace-Decliae Liae is oae of the si~lest 
iadicators to obtai& the fiJQres to plot. The tiaaacial 
sectioa of aost large city aews,.,.rs carry the a.oaat of 
stocks that &dvaaced aad decUaed on the previous day. They 
abo uy be toaad ia Bauop' 1. The aUIIber of stocks that 
have closed lower tllan the previous d.&y are nbtracted from 
the auaber of 1tocks that have eloPed hilber. This aet fig-
ure is added to the start iDI DUaber. This starUDI maher 
caa be zero or, as soae aaalyst1 prefer, tea thou1aad. The 
latter ti,.re is used to avoid rauaiDI iato •iaus territory. 
A cuaulat ive total i! kept by addiDI to it the aet advaaces 
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or subtractiDI troa it the aet decliaes. This cuaulative 
total is plotted oa a chart !Dd it laecoaes the Advaace-llecliae 
LiDo. Weekly tiJQres caa be used instead of daily tiaures 
with the same results. Charts III throulb VI depict the 
cuaalative Advaace~Decliae Liae. 
The reason tor the use of this iadicator is that 
it depicts the IIOV8Jients of the aarket as a whole much better 
tb.aa BDY ot the popular stock aarket indexes. 
OriJiD 
The iDdex was originated by the late Geaeral 
Leoaard P. Ay:res in 1926. Be weat throulb the finBDcial 
secUon of the newt~paper aad actually COUDted the n-ber of 
stocks that had ad.Taaced or declined from the preTioas day. 
The ind.ez has been continued by Jaaes F. Hupes. 
SifDificapce of l!y!l!pSs 
14 
The J.d.'Yuace-Decline Line is a non-price, unweighted 
index. When this line parallels the rises and falls of the 
Dow Jones Industrial ATera,e, it is conf6~iag. At such 
t~es the Dow Jones Industrial Averaae. is reflecting the 
true state of tlla ll&rket;. It is When the Advance-Decline 
Line diTerges traa the averaaes that it reyeals a technical 
state of the aarket coatradictory to surface appearances. 
Josepb E. GranTille set up aiae rules for interpretina the 
an•ents of the Advuace-Decliae Line in relaUon to the 
Dow Jones IDdastrial ATeraae. The essence of these rules 
is that 'the Dow J•es Indastrial ATerqe will ane event;ually 
ia She saae directian as the AdTaace-Decliae Line.5 He also 
says: "The .Ad'Yaace-Decline Line, 'taken alone, does not pin-
point the t !aiDa tor the sipaled advuces or react ions bat 
aerely sa)'ll that they are aoiaa to take place at some not 
too distant t iae. n6 
There are aany variations of the Advaace-Becline 
Line. ODe of the ori1inators of the AdTaace-Decline iadez7 
GraaTille 
• p. 131. 
uses adTBDces as a percantage of total issues ·traded and 
adds the 8IIOUDt over fifty per carat to a startina tiaure 
15 
of fifty per cent. Each sacceedin1 day the difference between 
the percentage of adTaDces and fifty per cent is added or 
subtracted fro. the prOTious total. Some analysts use various 
time periods tor movina averaaes ot the Advaace-Decline Line. 
Tbe AdTBDce-DecliDe Line has a history of predic-
tiDg the tops better thea the botto.s. This indicator reflects 
past everats because of its .ake up. 
Paul Pysart8 has c .. e across aa interesting sta-
tistic to aeasure the relative perfoz.ance of the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average with the net fi,mre of advances and declines 
tor a particular day. "It was fOUDd that for each three hun-
dred stooks excess, the Dow Jones lndastrial average chaaged 
one point."9 
AgalY!iB or Pal* I!!Ults 
1939 
Tbe sidewa7B aovement in the AdTBDce-Decline Line 
in 1939, while the Staadard aad Poor's 500 Index was movinl 
higher, indicated that the recovery from the 1937·1938 lows 
was to be short lived. This forecast proved to be correct 
8Director of Treadway, aa inveBtaent advisory service. 
9How to S!!l in the Mo,ey V~~ns Minorit~, (Louis-
ville, x:entucki, fr~way siooL: &ritW ervice, 19 1), p. 9. 
as the Studa:rd ud Poor's 500 Iadex tamed down daring the 
end of 1939 and coaUnaed in a downward trend anUl 1942. 
From 1940 to 1942 it paralleled the Standard aad Poor's 500 
Iadex. 
1942 
In the latter part of 1942, the Index and the 
Standard and Poor's 500 stan ad 011 1111 apning at the same 
Ume, ba1 t>,he upswing was sharper ia the Advance-Decline 
Liae thaa ia the Staadard and Poor's 500 I11dex. Tbis fore-
cast the rising .arket from 1942 aatil 1946. 
1946 
In 1946 the .ldvuce-»ecliae Line tamed down a 
little before the St&Ddard and Poor's 500 Index and the two 
indexes coatinaed to fluctuate in anison antil 1949. 
1949 
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In the middle of 1949 the .A.dvance-Decline Line 
started its apawiag at the saae Uae aa the Standard and Poor' 11 
500 IDdex; bat it rose 11110h faster than the Standard and Poor's 
500 Index, thus si&aaling a rising market to come. Both in-
dexes rose slowly for a loag period or time aatil the middle 
Of 1953o This depicted the &.all deCliDe 1D 1953. 
1953 
In 1953 the .ldvance-Decline Line accelerated its 
rise, correctly signaling the continuation of the advance. 
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1955 
A. warning was sigualed lase in 1955 when the Advance-
Decline Line leveled off as the Standard aod Poor's 500 Index 
coutiuaed going along unsil she aiddle of 1956. A.t this ttme 
a reaction set into the Staodazd and Poor's 500 Index. A.fter 
a brief rally by the Staodard aad Poor's 500 IDdex in 1957, 
it declined to wbere it was iu 1955. 
1958 
A.t the start of 1958, the A.dvaace-Decliue Line rose 
mach faster thaD the Staudard aud Poor's 500 Index, thereby 
accurately forecasting a risiac .arket ahead. It curved 
dowuward as the · Stauda:rd and Poor 1 s 500 Index coot iuaed up-
ward in 1959, which si&D&led a slowly declining aarket until 
1960. 
1960 
A.t the end of 1960 the A.dvance-DecliDe LiDe showed 
signs of reversiDg its doWDward direction aad rose to a new 
high in Kay of 1961. Standard aad Poor's 500 Index rose froa 
the eDd of 1960 to the end of 1961. The A.dvaace-Dacliue Line 
declined briefly froa ita high and aOTed in a sideways pattern 
while the Standard aad Poor's 500 IDdex continued upward 
until the very end of 1961. Tbia divergent moveaent revealed 
the true weakening state of the market. The market declined 
rapidly froa the begiDDiDI of 1962 until June, 1962. 
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1963 (Finure) 
U the Uae of this writing (J8llaary, 1963), the 
stock market has risen a considerable distauce tra. i1s Hay 
and Jane, 1962 lows. The .ldvauce-Decline Line is now in 
position to contir. a rising ..rket. The averages have risen 
taster than the market as a whole ap to this point. In order 
tor the rise to be sa'batautial, the ACI:vauce-Decline L.ine will 
have to oat pertom the averages. The first few weeks in 
January, 1963, have shOWD this to be .the case. Thus 1;he 
Advance-Decline Line sea.s to be forecasting risinc prices 
abead •. 
Conclasioa 
The Advauce-Decline Line se ... to be a reliable 
•easare ot wha1; the stock aarket as a groap is actually doiag. 
It would se• iapracttcal to a:o apiDst a s1&D&l that it gives.· 
This Indicator appears 1;o be pioiDI io popularity as evideoced 
by aa azticle iD 1;he Janaary 21, 1963, issae ot Barroa's. It 
aa indicator is too widelr~ollowsd, it will lose soae ot its 
effective forecasting ability. The author feels 1;hat 1;his 
indicator should be included ia auy series ot indicators used 
by the tecJuaical stock .. rket aaalyst. 
CJU.PTU V 
HIGH-LOW IDBX 
Backgropp4 
The hips 8Dd lows that are mentioned in the Utle 
ot this index refer to stoca 118k1ng new higlul or new lows 
tor the year daring the preTi0118 day or weu.lO '!be new 
highs are plotted separately u are the new lows. Whea one 
is rising, the other will tall. This index tends to -eca.e 
saaewhat distorted around the end ot March end the begiDDing 
ot April ot each year. The reu011 tor this is that tor the 
first three months ot the year the aew highs end lows are 
figured on the previoas year plus the current year. Towards 
the end or March tne new highs aad lows. are based upon the 
current year. Since the base period is shorter, the trading 
range ot each stock is .ach D&f'ower aad, therefore, a small 
tluctuat loa in price will prodllee a new hip or new low. 
SifDilicapce of MOJIIepts 
AD increasing namber ot stocks ll&king new highs 
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aad a declining naaber of stocks making new lows are bullish; 
the opposite would be bearish. The namber of stocks ll&king 
new hips tends to top outll sooaer then the Bow Joaes 
lODepending upon wbether you are using daily or 
weekly tlgares. 
liThe curve turns dowaward. 
Industrial ~verage or the Standard and Poor's 500 Index. 
The number of stocks making new lows tends to top out be-
fore the averages reach their bottom point. 
Some analysts use the daily or weekly figures 
without any refinement. Some use moving averages. One In-
vestment advisory servicel2 uses a modified moving average 
for their ~dvance-Decline Line. The author feels that this 
would be a better way to present the High-Low Index. A mov-
ing average smooths the fluctuations in the movement of the 
index. A modified moving average produces an even smoother 
line. Charts numbered VII through X represent a five week 
modified moving average of new highs and new lows. They are 
computed separately as follows: Take the total of the past 
five weeks and subtract the aTerage week from the five week 
total. Add the current figure to the new total. Divide the 
total by five and plot the new figure. This method gives 
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less significance to the earliest figure that you are dropping. 
The reason for the importance of this indicator is 
that it measures the overall strength or weakness of the 
market. If only a few stocks are making new yearly highs 
while the averages are advancing, then this is not a healthy 
sign because the rise probably 1s concentrated in just a few 
stocks that influence the averages. At the other extreme, 
if the new lows do not diminish as the averages start their 
12The Cumulative Average, Pasadena, California. 
rise after a declining market, then it will probably prove 
to be a false start. A true ball market cannot be in effect 
until a large number of stocks are making new highs and very 
few stocks making new lows. A true bear market cannot be 
realized until a large number of stocks are making new lows 
and a very few stocks are making new highs. A large number 
of new highs and new lows discussed above would be over one-
hundred and fifty and the corresponding small amounts of 
stocks attaining new highs or new lows should be around ten 
to twenty. 
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The figures for new highs and new lows are found 
along with the advances and declines in most daily newspapers 
or they can be obtained from the "Market Laboratory Section" 
of Barron's each week. 
Analysis of Past Results 
In analyzing Charts VII through X, one has to take 
into consideration a previously mentioned fact. This is that 
sometime towards the end of March of each year, the new highs 
and lows are based upon a short period of time.l3 
1940 
During the early part of 1940, the highsl4 started 
to diminish and the lows picked up; this signaled a period 
13The time period is three months and it is very 
easy for a stock to make a new high or low. 
14Highs and lows refer to new highs and new lows 
in this chapter. 
of slowly deteriorating prices • 
. 1942 
The trend reversed itself after 1942 was a few 
months old by the hilha slowly p1Ckin& up &Dd &Tea more 
u.pGrtaat, the lowe were droppial rapidly. 
1946 
Prices rose aatil tke aiddle of 1946. The end ot 
the advaace .-. forecast by the rapid decline in the highs 
early ia 1946 along with aa iacrease in the lows. 
194.8. 
A false sipal was given in the aiildle ot 194.8 as 
hilbS rose Sharply aad decliaes were greatly reduced; but 
this coadition was reTersod shortly after. 
1949 
Prices contiaued to decline until the middle ot 
1949 whea the new ball urket was ori&inated. This was 
siJD&lod by a sharp reductioa in lows and a gradual increase 
in highs. 
1953 
Tbe 1953 slump was si~Qaled by a ..aller aaount 
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ot highs and a lar&e aaoant of lows. During the last quarter 
of 1953• hipa chan1ed direction aad moved up while lows also 
reTersed directioa and moved lower, thus predictiDI the im-
peadiDJ rise 1D the averages fro. late 1953 to 1956. 
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1955 
A couflrsing sip was observed as the highs de-
eliDed While the lows rose. This would lead the aaalyst to 
look for a decline in the ave races. bat none Clllle. The aver-
., •• leveled off during 1956 aad a decline followed in 1957. 
1957 
The later part or 1957 aud early part of 1958 pro-
duced a rising tread in hi&hs and a declining tread in lows; 
this was the cae that the rise ia prices weald start again. 
1959 
During 1959 trouble was sipaled by the declining 
highs aDd :rising lows. This was the warning for the decline 
during 196o. 
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Towards the end of 1960 a flrnhe:r reSUJRpUon of 
:rising prices was forecast by the :risiug highs aad falling 
lows. Prices :rose as forecast during 1961. 
1962 
A definite warnina for 1962 did not show up from 
the highs and lows. They did aet help the analyst during 
1962 at all. 
1963 
New highs have expaaded to bUllish levels and new lows 
have contracted to very low levels. This is a bullish sipal. 
conclqliop 
WheueTer the higbs rose oyer 125 aad the lows 
decliued under 15, the directtoa of the .arket was up. 
Wheaenr the lows rose OTer 100 &Dd the hiJbS decliaed under 
40, the direcuon of the .arket was doWD. This yardstick 
would haTe bean helptal ia predictiDI risiug prices in 1942, 
1949, 1954, 1958, aad 1961. It woald haTe spotted the de-
cliniD& prices in 1939, 1946, 1953, 1957 and 1960. The sil-
nal for 1962 ca.e .uch too late. 
This Iadicator is Tery T&luable iD predicting 
tops aud bOUcas. JI:Yea thouJb it gaTe a few atsleadiag 
signals, if they were not coafi~ed by the other indicators, 
thea no ham woald haTe resulted. This just poiDts out what 
was stated earlier that you CaDDOt rely oa one iadicator, 
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bqt you haTe to base your ;jdg•eut oa a group of iudicators. 
CJUPTU VI 
SHOBT INTEUST lllTIO 
Bacyropcl 
A short sale occurs wbea a person sells a stock 
that he does not OWD or wben he does not deliYer his owa 
stock to the buyer. In order to coaplete the transaction, 
the seller borrows the stock throalh his broker and deliYers 
the borrowed stock to the buyer. Traders who sell stock 
short will profit it the prices decliae, bat will lose aoney 
it the prices rise. 
Oace a aonth the .. euat ot shares sold short as 
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ot the titteeath ot the aoath are tabulated and reported by 
tbe lllew York Stock Bxchaap and the Mericaa Stock Bxchaage. 
The report is aade aYatlable t.o the public the working days 
after the cut-ott date. .l'l'be tet&l •oant ot shares sold 
short is called the Short Interest. The Short Interest Ratto 
is coapate4 by diYidiDI the total aaoant ot shares sold 
short by tb.e aYera,e d&ily Yolae tor the aoath • 
. SiiPilif!pCe ot loJ!!'!'*' 
This ratio a.aally ,..,es between. 0.5 and 2.5. A 
ratio ot 0.5 iDdicatet a aarket that is too hilh and a ratio 
ot 2.5 indicates a aarket that is too low. When the ratio 
rises, it is considered ballisk atter it passes 1.5; and wbea 
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it declines, it is bearish attar it passes through l.o.l5 
Iu a true bear aarket, a rise in the Short later-
est Ratio is not necessarily ballish aad this indicator should 
be discoaated at that tU.e.l6 The other iudicators shoald 
inform you whether the aarket is iD a bull or bear pbase. 
A larae, iucrea.iDI Short Iuterest reflects con-
siderable bearishDess. A ... 11, decrea.iDI Short Interest 
suapet geueral b11ll1shDees. History shows that these expec-
tatioas by short sellers usually proTe iucorrect. 
Why is a rising Short Iuterest Batio bullish? The 
aaswer to this queetioa is that a high Short Interest Batio 
meaas that the .. ount ot shares sold short is increasing 
taster thaa the aTerap daily volu.e. ETery short sale ha. 
to be COTeretl &$ cme Uae or aaother. When stock is tiaallr 
bought to return it to the lender, it prOTides buy orders to 
either hold the price steady or start it upwards. As soon 
as a stock shows SilOS ot risiD&. the other short sellers 
rush iD to coTer their shorts.l7 They do this to take their 
profits or cut short their losses. Therefore, the aore stocks 
sold short, the laraer the poteatial cushion the stock market 
has in the future. A little bullish news is all that is needed 
1~raaTille, p. 142. 
161W· p. 143. 
17They bay the stack to return it to the leader, 
thus complet ina the t raaasaot ions. 
to st~late a rise because as the prices start qp aad a 
tew short sellers cover, the prices rise evea further &Dd 
aore aad aore short sellers cOTer. 
Tbe Short Iaterest Batio is ca.pated b:y Barroa's 
&Dd is toaad 1D their "Market t..borator:r SecUoa". 
Tbe Short Iaterest a.tio aeasures the .. ouat ot 
bearish thiDkUac arowad. "Like all seat t.eat aad opiu iou 
iu the stock -.rut, aaaat.U:r act hates the law ot cou-
trar:r actioa".l8 The Short luterest Ratio is iucluded iD 
Chart I. 
.t.palpis ot hi* lt!Sl!f 
1946 
Iu Jaauar:y, 1946, the dowutur.a ia the averaces was 
siCD&led b:y !he decliue iD the Short Iuteres! Ratio below 
1.0 tor s&Teral aouths. 
1947 
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Ia 1947 aad 1948 the iudex cave aa iucorrect signal 
becease it pushed !hrnp the 1.5 level aad the aarket aoved 
sideways aad dowuward tor a while. There was uo .. ;tor up-
ward aove as predicted b7 the Short Iuterest latio. Gran-
ville, 1D his book, does aot ... tiou this talse signal at 
au.l9 
l8c;r841T1lle, p. 141. 
19Ibid., p. 143. 
1948 
The next sigaal to appear was a declining Short 
Interest Batio in Juae of 1948: bat it was quickly reversed 
in March of 1949. The averaaes reflected the prediction of 
the Short Interest Ratio by decliniaa fraa the aiddle of 
1948 to the aiddle of 1949. 
1949 
The Short Interest latio rose from its March, 1949 
siiD&l to a very hilh point in July of 1949. This was to 
BiiDal a new bull aarket. 
1950 
The Short Interest Ratio siiDaled a halt in the 
uplfard. aoveae~~t in July, 1950, aad aave a bullish sigaal 
in Karch, 1951. Tke averaaes did not act as the Short In-
terest Ratio predicted. The decline in July, 1950. was 
only for that aonth. The averaaes never uaderwent the de-
eliDe that was predicted by the Short Interest Ratio. 
1951 
The Ratio turned bullish in March, 1951, which 
was a valid aigaal as the averaaes kept risinc. 
1952 
The decUniD& SiiDa1 cuae in Dec•ber of 1952 
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ud lasted uaUl July ot 1953. duriDa which t'ille '!;he averaaea 
aoved sideways for a Uae ud. then declined. 
1953 
The zisiDI tzead ia the Shozt Iatezest Ratio fraa 
July, 1953, lasted. uaUl Dec•bez, 1954. The aa.rket actually 
zoee furthez &ftez Dec .. ber, 1954. The decliaia& signal of 
Dec .. ber, 1954, was aot a valid one. Tbe Shozt Interest 
Ratio r .. aiaed ia neutral 1roaad. between 1.0 aad 1.5 for the 
r .. aiader of 1955, 1956, aad 1957. 
1958 
The Ratio 1ave a bullish siJDal ia February, 1958. 
This siJDal proved to be a valid oae as the averaaes rose. 
The aext beazish siJDal appeared ia Dec .. ber •f 1959; aad 
a valid bullish siJDal aevez o ... aaaia uatil AUJUst of 1962. 
The &Teraaes actually zose betwee• Dec•ber, 1960, aad Dec•-
ber, 1961; bat this does aot .. aa that the stocks that aake 
up the .. rket ea~oyed such a rise. The bullish siJDal ia 
AuiQ8t, 1962, has proven to be a valid one because the •azket 
rose after the st,aal was 1ivea. 
1963 
At the pzeseat tt.e the Short Interest Ratio is 
d.ecliaiDI slowly. It is not bearish yet, but aeithez is tt 
real bllllish. Since the last 81JD&l liVeD was a bullish oae, 
the indicator .ust still be considered bullish. 
OoaclgtiO! 
This indicator seas to be fairly accurate, but 
it has also liven sevezal erroneous indications. This 
indicator would have io be classified as less effective 
thaD the previous indicators, bai siill should be included 
ia ihe group of indicators. It did torecasi the rise in 
ihe laiier pari or 1962, Which is io iis credit. 
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CHJ.PTU VII 
LOW PBIOD STOCK INDEX 
.Backnogct 
Since there are different types of stocks that 
aake up the aarket, it is reasonable to asauae that various 
1roaps act differently as the aarket pro1resses in a particu-
lar direction. The Dow Jones IDdastrial ~verage aeasares 
the hiper priced, quality stoob. Studard ud Poor's 
500 stock ID4ex uses •ore stocks thu the Dow Jones Indus-
trial ~veraae, bat it is weipted so that the laraer coapan-
ies influence the index in the ... e aattner as they influence 
the Dow Jonas Industrial ~veraca. ~t ttaes the .arket, as 
represented by the two leadinl indexes, can appear to be 
headed hiper bat all the stocks are not in a risin1 trend. 
There are two indexes that aeasare the aovaaeats 
of the 1 ow priced stocks. 20 ODe ia standard and Poor • s Low 
Priced Issues and the other is Barron's Low Priced Index. 
Si'!ifiO!DCe of Mf!!lf!tS 
Stocks selling in_the low price category usually 
have two occaaions when activity reac!les a pinnacle, the 
first beiDI mach greater than the second. The first increase 
in activity occurs when trader• realize that a new ball 
aarket is a reali t:r. They proceed to purchase stocks that 
20stocks selling under $20.00 a share. 
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they consider are under ~riced. These are low-priced stocks, 
sa.e ot which aay have been hilher priced at one tiae but 
have declined and have tailed to participate in the latest 
rise in prices. These low-priced stocks are then bid up to 
prices that are unreasonable in relation to the prospects 
ot the COIIpally. This index aKes a new hip and backs down 
troa it. This is the signal that the bull aarket has passed 
the halt way point. The secoDd iacrease in activity occurs 
when the speculative fever has 1ripped the saall stock pur-
chaser. Be usually busy in odd lots,21 bat now he sees a 
greater opportunity to aake aoaey quickly by buying low-
priced stocks in round lots.22 The' index will thea start 
back up to its old high point ~ will tail to reach the 
old level and will start back down hill. At this point the 
index is telliDI the analyst to watch out tor the end of the 
bull urltet that has been in ettect tor the past tew years. 
Once the current aoveaent in the avera1es tails 
to be coatiraed by the Low Priced Stock Index, thea the 
mov•eat becomes subject to a dearee ot doub'& as to how long 
it will coatiaae. The toppiDI oa'& ot this index is au early 
sign ot loss ot coattdence in the aarltet as a whole. 
21An odd lo'& is a transaction tor less than the 
usual one hundred sbare lot. 
22A roaad lot is a transaction tor one hundred 
shares or any aultiple thereof. 
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!Dalf!is of P!ft Berglts 
Chart na.ber I contaiDs the •onthly average of the 
0 
weekly Standard and Poor's Low Priced Index. The choice of 
the monthly figare rather thaD a weekly fiJQre was because 
this Indicator is a long te~ iDdicator and, therefore, there 
is no need tor weekly tigares. 
A decline 1D the Low Priced Index from a high point 
occurred in the beginning ot 1946 giving a warning that the 
averaps would likely tarn aroaud and head dOWD. This is 
what actually happened. 
1950 
The next sipal occurred darina the beginning ot 
1950 as the Index rose gradually above recent high points 
to coat irm the rising act ion of tlle averages. 
1952 
Trouble was BllllOUDCed daring 1952 when the Index 
backed away troa the hi~ it made iD 1951. Tbia was a 
forecast ot impending softness in the avera,es during 1953. 
1954 
The rise in the Index daring 1954 aad continuing 
until the aiddle of 1957 confi~ed the rise in the averages 
dariDI this period. 
1957 
This Index turned dowa just atter the •iddle of 
1957 confir.ing the decline ia prices at that tt.e until the 
begiDDinl Of 1958. 
1958 
The greatest gain in the Index started in January, 
1958, and reached the hilbest point in April, 1959. 
1959 
The Index declined froa May, 1959, until Dec .. ber 
of 196o. This confi,.ed the rise in the avera.-• and fore-
casted the subsequent decliae durinl 1960. 
1961 
The rise ta the Index which started in January 
of 1961 coafimed the rise in the averaaes during that year; 
1xR the Low Priced IDdex was below the prnious hip point 
of April, 1959, tbas the ladex was saying that there was 
au illpellding decUae. This was exactly the correct forecast 
as the •rket reached a hip poiat at the end of Decaber, 
1961, aad the decline during 1962 occurred. If the first 
sigaal was aot eaoap to warn investors or the dlmcer &bead, 
the secoad siJD&l civen ia April, 1962, should have been the 
clincher because atter decliainl troa the May, 1961, hip, 
the Index rose a&ain; but the higbest point it could reach 
was in March, 1962, below the May, 1961, hich. 
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. 
At 1he present tt.e the Low Priced Index is risin& 
slowly; ba1 it will have to keep on risiDI to contiza the 
present rise in tbe avera,. •• 
Concl9f1ap 
The Low Priced Index is a valuable indicator be-
cause no real rise ia prices occur without a coatizain& rise 
later on. Tbis Indicator will aot enable the investor to 
aet into the .. rket at the bott .. , ba1 it will contir. the 
other iadic&tors ahortly attar they cive a valid &iJDal. It 
will iadicate that aa error ai~t have been aade it it does 
not coatir. the indicators. ~is Indicator should be iacor-
pOratod iato the aroup of indicators used to predict the 
pri .. ry tread. 
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CIUPTD· VI I I 
THE YIBLD CYCLE 
BtcJtJrmme' 
The Yield Cycle IDdicaior does ao~ liTe the ezact 
UaiDI of cllauges ia ihe paeral direcUoa of the aal'ke~ 
aoTe.eat •. I~ is ased as a gaide io detemaiae whea the aar-
ke~ is really UDderpl'iced, aad, therefore, due for a period 
of rising prices, aad whea the aarket is oTerpriced, aad, 
therefore, dae for a decline ia prices. 
!he yields that t~is Iadex refer to are the divi-
deads on the thirty stocks t~ .ate qp ihe »ow Jones Iadas• 
trial ~Tera1e23 in relatioa io the price of the Dow Jones 
Iadastrial ~Tera,e. 
The time when the yields are the hi&hest is when 
no cme waats to 'b1l7 stocks. '.ftle prices of ~he stocks 10 
dOWD taster tll.aa ~he dividends ud ~he yields 10 qp. When 
prices 10 up fas~er ~han diTideads, ~he yield declines. 
When the yields reach enr•e poiats, ihen the aarkei is due 
for a ch8D1e in the dil'ecticm of ihe present trend. 
The reason that yields are lowest when the outlook 
is brilhtesi and hi&hest when the oatlook is darkest is that 
the yields reflect the prices that ihe inTestor is williDI 
to pay. These prices are no~ based 011 "somad reasouiDI but 
23The total diTidends are divided by the aver•••· 
on hopes 1111d ezpectat ions".24 
As a general rmle of tbaab, to dete~iDe When the 
aarket is Talnerable, Charles Dow aaed 3! per cent as an 
indtcator.25 
This Indicator ahoald be ased to BiJD&l tiaes to 
be oa the laokoat for a ch&llge in direction. 
The yt•lds on the Dow Jones Indastrial ATarage 
caa be fouad in the ''Market Laboratory SecUoa" or Barron's. 
SilpifiC!pC! Of lf!!I!B!S 
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As the percentage rises aboTe six or saTeD per 
cent, a rise 1D prices shoald be uticipa"ted. llTentually, 
inTas"tora ·will realize "that s"tockB are attractiTe as an in-
Tea"taent aedi1111. 1flutD the parentage declines below three 
and one-halt per cent, a decliae in prices aay be a reality 
in the near -..are. The fluctaatioaa between these two areas 
haTe no forecasting ai,aiticaace. 
Aa&llJi• or Pal* ••fUlt• 
A bay !iiD&l .., liTBD wbeneTer the yield reached 
1.0 per cent aDd a !all 1i,aal was giTen wbenaTer the yield 
declined to 3.2 per cent. There were two bay fitaationa and 
two 1all sita-*ions si~naled daring the past twenty years. 
25.1!Wl.. p. 67. 
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1941 
The first buy indlcaUou occurred in December, 1941. 
A rise in prices followed anttl 1946. 
1946 
The ter.inatioa of the upward pr~ry trend was 
forecasted in May, 1946. This aipal was givtm in e11oap 
tt.e to enable investors to dispose of their stocks before 
the prices dropped. 
1949 
The nen bay aipal was recorded ill July, 1949. 
The •arket respoaded by stagi1ll an t.presaive rise. 
1959 
The final sell siiDal ca.e in March, 1959, al•ost 
tea years later. The stock •arket continued hi per after 
the sell siiDal, bat oaly a ..all portica of the final rise 
ill prices waa •issed. The stock .arket was in a dangerous 
position at that tt.e and the sell siiD&l was a valid one. 
No siiDal has been given since 1959. According to this in• 
dicator, the .. rket is nearer a sellina area thaD a bayi111 
area. 
copclvion 
It is evident that this is strictly a loag ter. 
indicator, bat it serves as another guide as to the coDdiUo11 
of the market. It is the opinioa of the author that this 
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iDdicator should be referred to bat there is no gain from 
plottinc the fi~res on a chart. Visual inspection of the 
ficures themselves should serYe the same purpose. The Yields 
can be found on Charts VII throalh x. 
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CJUPTD IX 
FREE CREDIT BU.4NCE IN.DU 
B!Ckflogpd 
The Free Credit Balaaces are the balances due the 
cust011ers on the broker's books. They are ooaposed or the 
proceeds received trom a sale or stock lett in the investor's 
account. The balaaces will increase whea investors sell their 
stock &Dd leave the cash received 1a their brokeraae account. 
They usuall7 leave the cash in the account because the7 ex-
pect to bqy stocks a,ain soaett.e in the tature. This index 
measures the amount or cash or potut tal buyi~ag power that 
is available ill brokerage accoats. These funds belong to 
the small investor because the larae, sophisticated investors 
will uot let their funds stay UDproductive. They will iDvest 
the• 1D short term obligations to eal'D ioterest. Therefore, 
this iudex provides a good iodioation or what the .. all, 
but not necessarily the oad lot 1Dvestor is doillg at a givea 
t iae. The treDds or this index often run parallel to those 
of the odd lot iudexes. There is still sufficient difference 
betwe8D this indicator aad the odd lot indicators to render 
it useful. Just as with all the iadicators, ODe confirms 
the action or the other aad helps pinpoiat the actual tul'D in 
the trend. 
When .. all 1avestors are uot confident about the 
future, they will sell their stocks aad the free credit 
balances will build up. When they are optt.istic, they buy 
stocks and their credit balances are reduced. Chart II con-
tains the Credit Balance Indicator. 
Si&piticance ot MoJ!!ents 
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Dr. Sloan J. Wilson has published the first complete 
work on this relatively recently followed indicator.26 He 
set up several rules to follow when interpretin« this indica-
tor. The 1eaeral principle set forth in his study can be .wa-
ll&rized by stat inl that a rise tr• a previous low level by 
ths Free Credit Balance Index SiJDals a rise in the prices 
ot stocks. Conversely, a decline t:r011 a. hilh point indicates 
an t.peudinl tall in the prices of stocks.27 
Dr. Wilson feels that uthis is an indicator ot a. 
deep anderlyiDI force of priaary aarket move.ents".28 ln 
other words, it should be reaarded as ' reliable indicator 
of a. priaary trend and should not be used to spot short term 
trends. 
This indicator se ... to torm very definite unwaver-
ing trends, which once established, tend to continue with 
little interruption until it reverses a. previous trend. 
26sloan <I. Wilson, PgblJ; Paruci.,Uon in ~he stock 
Market, (Pawlet, Vermont, Fr&8erbllshing o., 1962 • 
27.!!l.1t• t Po 11 
2Bibid. 
U.ually ~he Free Credi~ Balaaces will rise duriag 
~he early &Dd aiddle s~ages or a aajor rise in ~he market. 
EYen~ually ~be Free CredU Balaaoes will s~ar~ ~o drop as 
prices conUaue ~o rise. This should be ~aka as aa early 
warning sigaal ~ha~ all is net well. The aain ~hrus~ or ~he 
adTaace is usually OTer Wbea this diTer1eace be~ween ~he Free 
Credit Balaaces Bad the popular &Terages is no~ed. The Free 
Credi~ Balaace Iadica~or has.prOT8D ~o be a ae&8Ure of Wba~ ~be 
.. all inTes~or is doing; bat before a Talid SiJDal as ~o a chaage 
iD direc~ion of a priaary ~read should be in~erpre~ed as being 
giT8Do i~ should be coafiraed by ~he Odd Lo~ indica~ors aad also 
by ~he Debi~ Balance Indica~or discussed in ~he nezt chap~er. 
No ball aarke~ is usually coaple~e with~ the pab-
Uc rushing in to the ~~&rket to bay. The eztent to which the 
public has become inTolTed in 'the steck aarke't can be aea.ured 
by the Free Credit Balance Indicator. 
AD&llfil of P!t* Rtf9l't! 
1946 
A. risinl tread turned dowaward begiDDing in March, 
1946. The declining aoTeaent coapled with the rising aTerages 
sipaled the break in the stock -rket Wbich darted in July, 1946. 
1949 
The dec lining aoTeaent proceeded. along its course 
aatil a risin1 moT ... n't started in August, 1949. This aoT .. ent 
coofi~ed the rise in the averaaes as they both had started 
up toaether. The rise in the BYeraaes was paralleled by the 
Indicator until Karch, 1951. 
1951 
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In Karch, 1951, the Iadicator turned downward while 
the averaaes continued upward. This diveraence between the 
avera1•• and the Indicator predicted a decline in prices. 
The decline c•e, but not tor two years. The tact r•ained. 
that there was a warnina aivea. 
1953 
In Sept .. aer, 1953, a rise in the Indicator be1aa. 
A aonth later the averaaes started upward. Since the time 
that the Indicator turned up aad the averages turned up was 
so close toaether, this actioa would have to be classified 
as conti~ing aotiOD rather thaD a prediction. 
1955 
The ascendinl pattern ef the i11dex tenainated in 
Jaauary, 1955, as the Indicator aegaa descendiag. As this 
took place, the avera1e• cootiDaed. thei:r rise. Thus the 
diverpnce between the avera1u ead the Iadicator forecast 
.. 
a decline in prices. The averactts CODU11ued to rise until 
the aiddle of 1956, whu they decl111ed in February, 1957, 
rose until July, 1957, and declined a,ain until December, 1957. 
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1958 
Tile Iadex &ave DO adTIIDCe DOUce of the Den rally, 
Which started Jaauary, 1958. Both the Indicator and the 
averaaes started their upward aov•ut together. It the aver-
a,es had started upward witboat the IDdicator coutir.inl the 
rise by staatn1 8D advance, thea the rise in the avera1es 
could have beeD discounted as DOt aaoaD"tiD& to auch ot a rise. 
1959 
The lades topped out iD Kay, 1959• aad started down-
ward. Tbe aver&~es respollded by reaching a hilh poiDt in 
July, 1959, aad slowly •oved lower until Moveaber, 1960. 
1960 
Tbe rise in the averaaes that started ill Moveaber, 
1960, was foretold b,y the Indicator's rise Which started in 
J.upst, 1960. 
1961 
J. warniDI sip appeared iD June or 1961, as the 
IDdicator reached liD all UIDO hip29 and backed dowa. Then 
it began to rise fra. September, 1961, to December, 1961. 
The Iudicator declined traa Jaaaary, 1962, until July, 1962. 
JluriD& this Uae, the stock ~ket suffered a severe decliue. 
29J.s lODI as figures have been available. 
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1962 
A rise in the aarket after the crash was confi~ed 
as the Indicator aad the averaaes rose to1ether. There was 
no adTaDce wam1ng of the ral17 that took place after the 
steep decline in prices. 
CoaclqaiOJ 
This Indicator has proveu extr .. ely asetnl in pre-
dicUDI the lon& tezm mov .. eats of the stock •arket. The only 
exception, of coarse, was the very peculiar recent rise in 
the stock •arket after the 1962 decline. This Indicator should 
he considered as one of the •ost reliable indicators in the 
technical analyst's collection. 
CHAPTER X 
DEBIT BALANCES 
BackgrOt!Jld 
Debit Balances are amounts that are owed to the 
brokers by the public. It is basically the amount of out-
standing margin loans which have been made by brokers to 
enable their customers to carry securities on margin. It is, 
therefore, a measure of the degree of speculative confidence 
or enthusiasm. It tends to start rising rapidly just as an 
important market rise gets under way. It continues rising 
as prices advance until it stops rising and starts moving 
sideways or declines slowly. This usually occurs well before 
the final top in the averages. 
This Index should be used to confirm the credit 
balances. The indexes do not pinpoint the exact top or bottom, 
but they give a warning that a change is due in the future. 
The Debit Balances represent the so-called smarter 
money becaase it is reasoned that the investor has to know 
what he is doing when he buys on margin. A question can be 
raised as to the validity of this assumption. 
Dr. Sloan J. Wilson30 explored the Credit Balance 
Indicator in great length but only briefly mentioned the Debit 
Balance Indicator. It is the author's opinion that the Debit 
30Wilson, p. 11. 
Balauce Indicator is just aa usefUl if not more than the 
Credit Balauce Indicator. Both indicators are valuable and 
become evaa more so when both are considered before a tore-
cast is attempted. 
The section describiDa the past results of this 
Indicator shows how well the Indicator has predicted the 
aaajor trends in the stock market. 
The Debit Balance tiaares are found, among other 
places, in Barron 1s "Market La'boratory section". There is 
usually a tiae lag of two or three weeks after the end of 
the month in question before the figure is available. The 
Debit Balauce Indicator can be found on Chart II. 
Si19ificance of Movements 
The significant mov ... nts in this Indicator are 
siailar to those ot the Credit Balance Indicator. The tit-
terence is that the Debit Balaace Indicator usually signals 
the rise or tall ot prices closer to the actual movement 
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than the Credit Balance Indicator. When the Indicator rises, 
it is bullish. On the other haDd, when the Indicator falls, 
the indication is bearish. 
1945 
The Index started dowuward in July, 1945. Prices 
continued to rise as the Index maintained its duw.oward trend. 
This siJDaled ~he drop in prices ~welve aou~hs la~er. The 
decliue in ~his Index leTeled ott during 1947 aud 1948 as ~he 
s~ock aarke~ s~ayed in i~s depressed s~a~e. 
1949 
A rise commenced in ~he Index in April, 1949, as 
~he averaaes moved downward. This correctly torecas~ ~ha~ 
~he priaary ~rend had been reversed aud now i~ was in ~he 
upward direc~iou. The Index rose uu~il February, 1951. 
1951 
Fro. Karch, 1951, uutil February, 1953, the Indica-
tor DIOTed in a sideways d1rec~1oa siJDaling a possible reaction. 
The reac~ ion ~hat wu predic~ed occurred in the rom or a 
minor decline. 
1953 
In Karch, 1953, ~he Indicator started upward as the 
averaaes started in the opposite direction. That was the 
sigaal tor the adT&Dce in the stock market that occurred in 
Septeaber, 1953. 
1955 
Trouble was predicted in October, 1955, as the 
Indica~or halted its upward aoveaent and s~arted a sideward 
aov•eu~. This happened while the averages continued to move 
hiper. An irregular up Blld down aarket was followed by a 
definite decline started in Au,ast, 1957. 
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1957 
As the averages were decl1u1ug, the Indicator started 
upward ill September, 1957. This aoveaeut forecast the sub-
sequeut rise iD prices that started iD Jauuary, 1958. The 
Indicator rose UDtil Karch, 1959. 
1959 
The averages aoved slightly higher as the Indicator 
began to decliue iD April &Dd coutiuued declining UDtil Octo-
ber, 196o. This sigDaled the decliniug aarket of 1960. 
1960 
The Iudicator once atain turued upward in November, 
1960, aa averages decliued. This was the forecast of the 
rise 111 the averages to a uew all tiae high iD December, 1961. 
1961 
The IDdicator turued arGUDd &Dd headed downward iD 
Hay, 1961. This moveaeut forecast the crash duriug 1962. 
1962 
It turned up again briefly duriug Hay and JUDea 
1962, bui dropped as fast as it rose the next two aonths. 
At the present time, it is riaiag and it appears to be 
coufiaaiug the rise iD the averages. 
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Copclus1op 
This Indicator also appears to be a very useful and 
valuable forecaster. It appears to be forecasting shorter 
term aov•ents thab was true iD the past. This may be because 
the current lone term moveaents have become shorter in dura-
tion in the past few years. 
CHAPTER XI 
ODD LOT TRADING RATIO 
B&ekUO!IIId 
An .Odd Lo~ ~ransactioa is one ~hat involves less 
thaD one huDdred shares ot steck.31 The avera1e iuves~or 
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is not able to bay oae hundred shares ot stock every tiae he 
invests his money. The traasactiou involviua less than one 
lumdred shares is classified as an Odd Lot transaction. Tile 
Odd Lot ti,ares, therefore, rep~esent the purchases and sales 
ot the public. The 044 Lot TradiDI Ratio aeastues the aaoapt 
Ot activity OD the pa~ ot the Odd Lot investor (the public) 
in coaparisoa to the round lot32 volaae. 
The ratio is derived b7 add ina the a&O!IIIt ot Odd 
Lot purchases to Odd Lot sales 8Dd di'vidin1 by twice ~he vol-
uae or roaad lot transactioaa.33 The reason tor div1din& by 
~wice the roaud lot vol'lllle is tllat Odd Lot purchases and sales 
are added tole$her, whereas rOUDd lot voluae shows just sales. 
This iadicator helps aeasgre the degree tba~ ~he ..all inves~or 
is pa~icipatiDI ia the s~ock u~ke~. It a~~-~s to &auae 
public ps,oholoJY. Garfield •· D~e• is the ori&inator or 
31In ce~aia less active stocks the Odd Lot trade 
woald be in fewer thaD ten shares. 
320rders in .altiples Of ODS haDdred shares. 
33&artield A. Drew, Jew Methods tof Pfotit~e the ~~~ , (Bostoa, Massachusetii, The le ca t Priis, 
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~his Indica~or along wi~h ~he o~her indicators ~ha~ are com-
piled troa tiaurea ot ~he Odd Lo~ ~rausaottons. The Odd Lo~ 
tiaures appear daily in 11os~ larae ctty newspapers. Each week 
Barron'• provides weekly, as well as daily tigares. 
Simiticapce of Mo!•ets 
"The ual,-a~ 's so lit coaoern lies in being able to 
!lake deductions tr011 ~he son of behavior which usuall,- •P-
pears a~ atpiticu~ tumiD& poia~s in the stock aarke~ ".34 
Kr. Drew feels ~hat ~he Indica~or is issuing a 
aigaal tha~ the aarket is likel)" to rise or continue to rise 
when it consistentl,- declines below Dine per cen~. OD ~he 
o~her hud, when it has risen co~aaiatentl,- above eleven per 
ceut, a decline is beilll forecaat.35 
The theor,- tha~ followers ot the Odd Lo~ Trading 
Ba~ io emplo,- ~o predic~ future aoveaen~s ot ~he s~ock aarke~ 
is ~ha~ it ~akes a long ~iae for ~he public ~o tiDally realize 
~ha~ ~he a~ock aarke~ is in a risiDI phase or a declining 
phase. When ~he,- finally realise whicll phase the shck aarket 
is lao ~ha~ particular phase is abcnR ~o teraina~e. .1 high 
ra~io 1188118 ~ha~ they have realised which phase ~he aarket 
is in. & low ra~io shows tha~ the public is uncertain as to 
the directiea ot the aarke~. 
34Garfield &. Drew, "The KiSUDdera~ood Odd-Lotter", 
(June 25, 
Chart XII published by Drew Investment Associates, 
Inc. shows the •oveaents of the Odd Lot Volume Index, which 
is aaother DBIIIe tor the Odd Lot Trading Ratio, in comparison 
to the Dow Jones Industrial avera1e. 
Aualf8is or f!st Reeqlts 
1939 
A dowuward trend was noted begiuuing in the second 
halt of 1939 and continued until 1943. This downward •ove-
aeut in the Indicator toreca.t the eventual rise in prices 
start1D1 in 1942. 
1943 
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The Indicator started to rise during the latter part 
ot 1943, bat the rise did not continue. The movement developed 
into a sideways fluctuation unti• the second part ot 1945. 
Thas no siJDal occurred as prices continued to rise. 
1945 
A definite wam1D1 situ was building up as the 
Indicator rose traa the end or 1945 until aid 1946. This 
siJDaled the drop in prices from 1946 to 1947. 
1947 
The Indicator started dowuward duriDI the second 
half of 1946 and did not reverse its trend until 1951. This 
aov•eut would have caused iuvestors to enter the market too 
prematurely. The major decline had taken place but no advaace, 
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of the type sigaaled by the Indicator, took place. Instead, 
prices fluctuated for two and a balf years with no definite 
tread. Eventually, in 1949, prices did rise as the Indicator 
had predicted. 
1951 
The Indicator stopped declia1Dg aad started advaac-
iDI daring 1951 and 1952. The Indicator was pointing to a 
decline. The decline occurred in 1953. 
1953 
The Indicator tamed downward darinl 1953 aDd con-
tinued down until the end of 1954. This was the indication 
that higher prices were ahead. This tamed oat to be the 
case as the aarket cliabed rapidly from the end of 1953 until 
the beliDDiDI of 1956. 
. 1955 
A slowly rising trend occurred at the start of 1955 
and aaintained the rising trend until the end of 1957. Thus, 
a red lilht was flashina dariDI this period to warn that a 
decline should be expected. The decline started in fall force 
daring the second half of 1957, bat the actual advance was 
halted in the aiddle of 1956. 
1957 
The Indicator declined from the end of 1957 to 
the aiddle of 1958. This si1naled that prices should start to 
rise soon.. Prices did start to rise in the first half of 
1958 and continued until the end of 1959. 
1959 
Trouble was again forecast by the rising Indicator 
starting late in 1958 and continuing through 1959. Prices 
turned around and moved down during 1960. 
1960 
A declining trend was noted in the Indicator dur-
ing 1960. The decline did not go far enough to give a real 
signal, but it went just far enough to issue a caution sign. 
The results were that the market as represented by the aver-
ages rose during 1961, but most or the stocks did not parti-
cipate in this rise. 
1961 
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During 1961 the Indicator moved sideways for the 
better part of the year. The tact that it had slowly started 
upward before the sideways movement and that it was over 
10 per cent could have been conatraed as a warning signal. 
1962 
The charts for 1962 are not included in the thesis, 
but information can be drawn fro. figures available during 
this period. A rise that warned of trouble occurred at the 
beginning of February, but was reversed in March. This was 
a confusing signal that would have been very hard to interpret 
at the time it was ghen. Through the use ot hindsight, it 
is clear that the Indicator was saying that there would be a 
rise followed by a decline atte:r Wbich prices would rise again. 
This would have to be considered a short term approach and 
looking at the Indicator tr011 a lon1 term approach, as was 
done throulboat the previous part ot this analysis, no such 
signal could have warned ot the danaerous condition ot the 
market. 
1963 
At the present ti•e the Indicator is declining and 
givina a bullish signal. 
Conclg!ipp 
This Indicator sea.. to perform with a fairly hilh 
dearee ot accuracy as judaed by past experience. It does 
not pinpoint the exact thling ot the advances and declines, 
but it does aive a wamin& sip usually tar enough in advance 
to be ot use. An interesting poiut concerning the forecast• 
ina ability is that every tiDe the Indicator dropped below 
10 per cent, the stock market staled an advance. This occurred 
in 1943, 1949, 1958, and 1960. 
CIUPTEB XII 
ODD LOT BA.LA.KCE INDEX 
BacJqrOUDd 
The Odd Lot Balance Index, also originated by 
Garfield A. Drew, •easures the proportion ot purchases to 
sales. This Index is compiled by obtaining the ratio ot 
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odd lot sales to odd lot purchases and combining the daily 
ratios into a moving average.36 The Indicator is ased to 
measure the public's mood at any particular time, as was point-
ed oat in Chapter x. 
Ratios are ased instead ot tbe purchase and sales 
figures themselves because the utilization ot ratios avoids 
tbe frequent sharp fluctuations that woald occur in tbe abso-
lute figures. 
The theory behind the use ot this Indicator is that 
as prices rise and the small investor is finally convinced 
that prices will continue to rise, he will bay. Then as 
prices rise even higher, be does less baying because be is 
afraid that be .ay be paying too hilh a price. As prices 
sutter a reaction, the small tDYestor sees stocks selling at 
bargain prices, below their previous highs, and he bays stocks 
again. Prices may start back ap tor a while confirming his 
previous opinions. Then they decline once •ore and be bays 
agaia. Fiaally the market "nms out ot ps" aad heads lower 
without a rise to a aew high poiat. The odd lot iavestor 
teads to bay stocks as the market moves lower. Whea the 
market moves back ap, he is ript; bat Wbea the market drops, 
ot coarse, he has beea provea wroaa. The term "bay" should 
be clarified. It aeaas that more purchases are occarriag 
thaa sales. 
Historically, WbeD Odd Lot iDvestors bay, they 
bay from the more iatoraed trader, aad whea they sell, they 
sell to the more iatormed trader. It sea.s that the pro-
fessioaal acts coatrary to what the small iDvestor does at 
most tiaes. Siace the protessioaal trader has to aake moaey 
from his ope:ratioas to stay ia basiaess, aad the Odd Lot 
iDvestoJ: buys aDd sells stocks While eagaged ia some other 
occapatioa, a sate asaa.ptioa milbt be that the professional 
should be the ODe to follow whea making iavestaeat decisions. 
The p:rofessioaal has boalbt the stock whea it was low priced 
and kept on bayia& as the price :rose, finally he sells the 
stock slowly to the public at 1Dc:reasingly hilbe:r prices. 
The professional cu be &sSUIIed to be acUD& the exact oppo-
site ot the Odd Lot iDvestor. 
SiJD1ficapct or Hoy!e!Dts 
Whea the Iadex aoves lower, this is bearish; whea 
the IDdex moves higher, this is ballish. In order to ase 
this Indtx for a long term :rather thaa a short term indicator, 
the a.Dalyst has to haTe stae other measure to autde him. 
Drew says that the trend toward bllyiDg or sellin1 is the 
important thine to look for rather thaD the actual leTel of 
purchases or sales.37 The aathor became quite confused as 
to when a trend ended ud a.Dother one begu in the opposite 
direction. Tbese trends started quite a while before the 
market reflected their predicUon. A cuide line was set up 
to liTe a clearer sigDal. then the Indicator declined to 
80 per cent, a rise in prices was expected. A rise in the 
Indicator oTer 100 per cent si,.aled a decline in prices. 
Chart XI contains the Odd Lot Baleace Index. 
Apallfis ot P!f! Results 
1939 
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The hend tr011 1939 throup 1940 or the Indicator was 
down. This was a bearish sigD. The market headed down slowly. 
1941 
The trend reTersed itself in 1941 and started to 
rise sianalinl a risina market.· The market did rise. 
1943 
The trend started dowaward in the Indicator a.t the 
beginning or 1943 aDd continued dotnnrard until 1946. This 
trend sianaled that the move.ent in ·price waa to turn down. 
The definite sign showed up in 1946 when the Indicator de-
clined below the So per cent line. Prices started their 
decline in 1946 as predicted. 
1948 
.A. buy sianal waa liVeD by the Indicator ud a 
sell sicnal quickly reversed the previous signal. This 
waa a poor showing tor the Indicator as prices moved in 
a very narrow range. 
1949 
.A. rising move.ent can be noted in the Indicator 
starting id 1947 and finally givinl a bullish signal as 
it passed throap 100 per cent late in 1949. Prices start-
ed their rise shortly before the signal. 
1951 
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The Indicator turned down in 1951 and gave a bear-
ish signal as it passed through the So per cent level. Prices 
refused to move lower and contimred slowly higher. Thus this 
signal was a false one. Prices did eventually decline in 
1953, lnR this was two years attar the signal. 
1952 
.A. risiDa trend developed in 1952 and pve a bullish 
sicn 1D the latter part ot 1953, which proved correct. 
1955 
A warnina siJD was eTident as the Indicator start-
ed a decline 1n 1955 &Dd gave a valid siJDal at the end of 
1955. This period was difficult to forecast because the 
aarket halted its upward •ov .. ent in 1956, but the actual 
decline took place in 1957. 
1958 
A rising trend coaaenced ea.rly in 1958 &Dd a sig-
nal waa given towards the end of the year as the Indicator 
rose past the 100 per cent .ark. The market started Us ac-
tual rise several months ehead of the actual signal. The 
timing of the actual signal preTented the analyst from get-
ting into the aarket at the bottoa. He would have boulht 
a short distuce froa the lowest level. 
1959 
The Indicator declined lD 1959 and aave a bear-
ish slp in the early part of the year. The aarket turned 
down iil the be&iDDin& •r 1960. 
1960 
A rise started in 196o in the Indicator and a 
bullish si10al was given in January, 1961. This proved cor-
rect as the aarket rose to au all Uae high by Dec•ber, 
1961. 
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1962 
The Indicator was not very usetul in 1962 as it 
failed to point out the "crash,''• 
The present trend indicates a possible rise in 
prices. 
Conclusloa 
It seams that this Indicator has lost some of its 
predictive ability in recent years. This may be due to the 
fact that it has been a very reliable forecasting device 
and any indicator that is good ud is widely follcawed, as 
this indicator certainly is, will tend to become less reli• 
able u a larger lllDiber of persoas use it. 
The Indicator seemed to lead the ~~arket during the 
earlier years, but recently the lead Ume has been reduced. 
In the earlier years, the analyat could wait until a certain 
point was reached before a siJD&l was given. In the later 
years, the establisbaent of a trend in the Indicator would 
have been a better method of predicting the stock market. 
Whenever the Index declined below 80 per cent, 
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the outlook was bearish because a decline occurred in prices. 
This happened in 1946, 1947, 1951, 1955, 1956, 1957, aad 1959. 
Whenever the Indicator rose over 100 per cent, the market was 
due for a rise. This happened 1D 1949, 1953, 1958, aad 1960. 
Several other times the market did not rise; this was during 
the early 1940's and 1948. 
When ODe analyzes the past movements, it is appar-
ent that the Odd Lot trader is not always wrODg bat is right 
almost as often as he is wrODg. The important point to remem-
ber is that he is wrODg at illlponant long term tops and bot-
toms. 
This Indicator should be retained as it is useful 
as ODe of a collectiOD of indicators. 
CHAPTER XIII 
ODD LOT SHORT SALES INDEX 
Background 
This Index, like all the other Odd Lot indexes, 
measures the psychological mood of the pablic. This Index 
goes one step further because it attempts to measure the 
speculative mood of the pablic. 
The Index is a ten day moving average of the daily 
Odd Lot Short Sales. The same result is achieved if a five 
day moving average of the ratio of Odd Lot Short Sales to 
total Odd Lot sales is used.38 This should not be confused 
with the Short Interest as the Short Interest is a monthly 
figure based on round lot short sales. 
The reason for the use of this Index when there 
are two other Odd Lot Indicators is that this Index measures 
the amount of short selling done by odd-lotters. The short 
selling odd-lotters have a record of being less right than 
the regular odd-lotters. Chart XI includes the Odd Lot Short 
Sales Index. 
Significance of Movements 
\fhen this figure makes a peak and starts down, a 
rise in the stock market is expected because it means that 
38Garfield A. Drew, New Methods for Profit in the 
ftock Market, (Boston, Massachusetts, The Metcalf Press, 
954). p. 205. 
"be bottom bas beeu lll8de. The reason for this is the Odd 
Lot short seller is almost alwaya wrong at important tam-
ing points, thus the market shoald begia to rise. A period 
of aall Odd Lot short sales means thaa the market is due 
for a decline. 
1940 
The Index 1ave a sianal of rising prices as it 
reached a peak and started dOWD. Prtces rose slightly. The 
trend was reversed in 1941 by the Indicator as prices declined 
slightly. The Index signaled the slowly rising prices daring 
the middle of 1941. The Index then gave a bearish signal 
daring the latter part of 1941. Prices de611Ded as predicted. 
1942 
A rise was forecast by the Index as it rose and 
formed a peak in May. Prices were starting their climb at 
this tiae. A period of fallinl prices was signaled towards 
the end of 1943, bat no decline of any importance occurred. 
A rise was signaled at the beg1DDiD& of 1944 and prices did 
rise bat the rise was a continuation of the previous rise. 
1946 
The end of the important rise in prices for the 
past few years was predicted by the Indicator when it drifted 
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lower and lower and finally started back up. Prices declined 
rapidly at this point. 
1947 
A signal occarred ta 1947 as the Index rose to a 
peak and started downward. Prices rose for a while, bat not 
as .ach as the Index had predicted. This points out that 
the Index will not forecast the de1ree or the rise only that 
there will be a rise. The declining prices or 1948 and the 
first half or 1949 were signaled by the declining action in 
the Index before it started upward again. 
1949 
The Index rose until the middle or 1949 and start-
ed downward. This was an indication that prices woald rise. 
Prices rose as predicted until 1953. The Index gave a warn-
ing sign 1D 1950 as it ended its decline and started upward. 
Prices did decline slightly, bat before the Index had given 
its signal. The rise and subsequent down trend or the Index 
predicted the rise in the averages. This was a late sign, 
bat it can be considered a. confirming signal. 
1953 
A decline in prices was forecast by the Index as 
it began to rise after a period of declines. A :reaction 
did set in as prices declined. A resumption or the rising 
prices of the past was forecast as the Index started to rise 
and formed a peak late ia 1953. 
1957 
Prices rose antil 1957. This decline in 1957 was 
predicted by a rounding bottom area in the Index. The next 
rise in prices was signaled in 1958 &s the Index turned down 
after an upward movaaent. 
1959 
Trouble was forecast 1n 1959 when the Index started 
upward after a decline. A decline took place in January, 
1960. 
1961 
Higher prices were predicted after the Index made 
three peaks and finally turned down. Prices rose during 
1961 until December. 
1962 
The declining market of 1962 was forecast by the 
Index as it turned upward after declining in 1961. A rising 
market was forecast as the Index reached a high point and 
turned down during the middle of the year. 
Conclusiop 
This Index is useful to determine which movement 
is valid and what type of movement mi&ht be expected. It 
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should be used in conjunctioa with the other Odd Lot Indicators. 
It gave enough valid signals to warrant retention. 
CIUPTD XIV 
IMTEBMEDI~TE TEaK IMDICATOBS 
Each primary trend is composed of several inter-
•ediate trends. The inter.ediate trends are ot i•portance 
to the short tam t.rader ud, to a lesser anent, the long 
ter. investor. ~ long ter. investor shoald have an idea as 
to the direction of the inte~diate trend and how long it 
haa been 1D effect. This infom.ation is asefal in deciding 
on the •ost advutaa:eoas t i•e to invest his •oney. The short 
ter. trader is dependent upon the knowledge of the inter•edi-
ate term trends to IlSke his •CQtey. 
It is very difficalt to differentiate between an 
inter.ediate trend that •oves in an opposite direction than 
the primary trend. The ase of several intemediate tar• 
indicators facilitates the forecast as to the directton'and 
the type ot trend to expect. Long tam indicators should 
also be followed tor signals as to when the lona: term trend 
•ight be due tor a correction. 
~ i•portaat reason that inter.edtate ter. trends 
are so ditticalt to exploit profitably is that the forecast 
ot the beginning aud ending ot the intemediate trend have 
to be correct in order to take advantaa:e of the •ov .. ent. 
If the forecast at the start of the trend proved correct, the 
trader still has to correctly deter.aine when the trend has 
ca.e to an end in order to tally capitalize on the short ter. 
•ov•ent. 
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The greatest benefit in the use of these ind1ca1ors 
is when they agree with each other. That is the more indi-
cators that give a signal at a particular phase of an advance 
or decline in the market, the stronger a valid turning point 
will be indicated. 
At times the intermediate indicators seem to con-
tradict each other. If these contradictions seem evenly 
divided, it is best to wait antil the signals became more 
clear-cut as they tend to do sooner or later. When they are 
UDaDimous, they unally are giTiDI a valid signal that should 
not be ignored. 
Since the intermediate trends last from a few weeks 
to several aonths, the tiaing of them is extremely important. 
At tiaes the greatest part of the aoveaent can be concentrated 
into a short tble spaD at the beginning or the end. A trader 
has to have the latest information to base his decisions on. 
If his information is late in arriTing or he delays in making 
a decision, he aay lose potential profits or the paper profits 
that he already has acc1111111lated a&7 be wiped out. 
The iateraediate tera 1Ddicators that are included 
in this thesis are: The Ten Da7 Modified Hoving Average of 
the Net AdTances and Declines and Barron's Confidence Index. 
There are other short term indicators available 
to the analyst, bQt the purpose of this section is to acquaint 
the reader with the better and most widel7 used short term 
iDdicators. 
CHA.PTER XV 
TEN-WEEK MODIFIED MOVING AVERlGE OF 
.&.DV.lNCES .AND DECLINES 
Backcrrum9 
Tbis Index is used to siJDal an overbought condi-
tion or an oversold condition in the stock aarket. AD over-
sold condition aeans that the prices have temporarily de-
clined too tar and a rise in prices can be expected at any 
Uae. in overbought condition aeans that prices have tea-
porarily risen too fast and a reaction takinl prices lower 
should be anticipated. 
Tbis Indicator was originated by an investment 
advisory service.39 Tbey used daily advances and declines 
in their COIIprtations. In the interest ot conserving space, 
the fi(Q.res used in this thesis were compiled on a weekly 
basis. 
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The total ot net advances or declines tor the past 
ten periods is divided by ten. Tbe quotient is subtracted 
from the ori1inal total. Tbe net advances or declines tor 
the period are added to the new total it advances are greater 
and subtracted tram the new total if declines are greater. 
The .result ot this operation is then divided by ten and the 
.result is the ti~Q.re to be plotted. 
39The Caaalative Average, Pasadena, California. 
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The ~aotage of using this method as opposed to 
the more familiar moving avera1e is that the modified moving 
averaae reduces the effect of one particular larae number on 
the average. The fluctuations are smoothed out by using the 
aodified moving average.40 This result is achieved by droppina 
the averaae of the past ten weeks rather than the earliest 
week. The Indicator can be found on Charts III through VI. 
SiiQificapce of Mo~ements 
.• +.t the beainnina of an upswing, the buying power 
ot the traders is great; bat as the move continues upward, 
and is realized by more people, the tands available for con-
tinued bayina diainishes. The time eventually arrives when 
the baying power available is not great enough to absorb the 
selling orders as they arrive on the floor of the exchange. 
At this point, unless new bayina interest can be aroused as 
prices slowly decline, the advance is over. 
At the beginning ot a decline in prices, purchasing 
power builds ap. Eventually the decline will progress to a 
point where the traders feel that prices have declined as tar 
as they will go. At this point the stocks start to rise and 
the cycle is repeated all over aa&in. 
As long as the Index continues to move ap. it is 
evident that there is baying power lett. The time to watch 
out is when this Index stops rising and turns around. The 
40Ibid. 
-
opposite is true when the Index declines. As long as the 
Index is declining, no rise in prices should take place. 
When it stops declining and starts rising, this is the time 
to look tor a rise in prices. 
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When the Indicator changes direction, the time to 
take action is atter the averages show signs or changing 
direction. If the averages change direction withou1 a signal 
from the Indicator, any chan1e by the Indicator in the same 
direction as the averages should prompt action to be taken. 
!nalypis of P!f! Berqlts 
1939 
The Indicator began its decline from plus 1000 to 
minus 1760 as the averages followed in similar fashion. The 
Iadex rose from its low point to· plus Boo which signaled a 
rise in the averages. The Indicator dropped from plus Boo 
into minus territory and rose back to plus 1400. This quick 
fluctuation was very deceptive because the averages continued 
to move higher. The decline from plus 1400 to minus 700 was 
a false signal as !he averages did not decline for two months 
attar the start of the decline by the Indicator. 
1940 
The Indicator rose from minus 700 to plus Boo as 
the averages climbed higher. The decline from plus Boo to 
minus 650 started after the averages turned down. A false 
signal was given by the Indicator because it rose from minus 
650 to plus 1100 as the averages moved sideward. A drop 
in the Indicator from plus 1100 to minus 2200 preceded a 
decline in the averages. A rise from the previous low point 
to plus 2000 by the Indicator forecast correctly the rise in 
the averages. The decline by the Indicator from the high of 
plus 2000 to a low of miuas 950 predicted a loss in the 
averages. 
1941 
A rise occurred in the Indicator froa minus 950 
to plus 550 bat the averages moved sideways. The Indicator 
declined from plus 500 to minus Soo signaling a down trend 
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in the averages. This proved to be a good forecast. A rising 
trend was established by the rise from minus Soo to plus 1800 
by the Indicator. The averages responded with a rise. The 
Indicator turned downward and declined to minas 1650. correctly 
indicating a decline in prices. 
1942 
After a brief rise. the Indicator turned down. 
This signal came a short time after the averages started a 
similar move. The signal did come in enoagh time to take 
advantage of part of the move by the averages. The Indicator 
rose·from minas 1900 to a high of plas 2300. This was a valid 
si&D&l of the rise that was staged by the averages. After 
this rise by the Indicator, it declined to plus 700 but this 
decline was not reflected in the averages. 
1943 
The Indicator rose fraa plus 700 to plus 3400 and 
than moved in a horizontal direction and finally moved in a 
defiDite downward direction until the end of the year. The 
averages rose slowly and then turned around following the 
prediction of the Indicator. 
1944 
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A rise started late in 1943 in the Indicator and 
also in the averages. Both continued slowly up until the 
Indicator declined from plus 1900 to minus 350. The averages 
responded by declining slightly. Both the Indicator and the 
averages rose until the Indicator reached plus 2900. At 
this point both the Indicator and the averages declined. The 
rest of the year produced a very irregular pattern. There 
were no major movements and the Indicator fluctuated within 
a very narrow range. 
1945 
The Indicator moved from plus 2800 to plus 900 as 
the averages moved in a sid.eward direct ion. During the course 
of the year, the Indicator moved up and then down as the 
averages followed the trend set by the Indicator. 
1946 
Daring 1946 ~he Indica~or and ~he averages moved 
~oge~her during ~he minor ~rend, ba~ the Indicator signaled 
the ma~or downward movemen~. The Indicator also predicted 
the upturn in prices late in the year. 
1947 
There were two upward movements and two downward 
movements in the averages durina; the year. The Indicator was 
able to pinpoint the tour tarnina points. 
1948 
The pattern of 1947 was repeated in 1948. The 
Indicator proved reliable in 1948. 
1949 
After an irregular start in both the Indicator and 
averages, the Indicator moved up sharply at the sa.e tuae 
as the market averages. Then aa the averages continued to 
rise, the Indicator fluctuated in a horizontal pattern. 
1950 
The Indicator turned downward at the beginning of 
the year. The averages declined bat only daring June and 
July. Both the Indicator and the averages resumed the upward 
trend. This action continued until November wben the Indica-
tor and the averages moved sideward. 
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1951 
A decline was forecast by the Indicator that took 
place in February. The subsequent rise and decline that 
occurred in the averages was not predicted by the Indicator 
as the Indicator moved lower. The Indicator signaled a rise 
as the averaaes started to clU.b. The Indicator also pointed 
to a decline late in the year, bat a decline in the averages 
was not evident. 
1952 
The Indicator showed no major moves just minor 
advances aad declines. The averages moved parallel to the 
Indicator throughout the year. 
1953 
The Indicator predicted the March drop in the 
averages. It confirmed the upward movement in the averages 
in Jane, the downward t rend in &apst , and 'the upward t rend 
in October. 
1954 
The averages moved upward for the most part daring 
the year. The Indicator had a rather disappointing record 
daring the year as it 11oved in short up aad dowu movements 
throughout the year. 
1955 
This was another year of generally rising prices, 
bat the Indicator was way ott the track. It moved slowly 
downward all during the year. 
1956 
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The Indicator performed well this year. The aver-
ages followed the same course as the Indicator throughout the 
year. It sigaaled the rise in Mazch and April, the decline 
of May and June, the rise of July and August, the decline 
in September, October, and Nove.ber. 
1957 
The huUcator COIDIIIenCed 1UI upward movement in 
February, which was confi.naed by the averages. A decline 
in the averages in July was sigDaled by the Indicator. In 
November the Indicator started upward as the averages were 
forming a bottom. 
1958 
The rising trend of the Indicator established dur-
ing the latter part of 1957 and continuing into 1958 predicted 
the rise in the averages during 1958. The Indicator failed 
to continue to rise after Kay. It moved in a horizontal 
pattern for the rest of the year as the averages continued 
upward. 
1959 
The Indicator started down in March as the aver-
ages continued higher. The averages finally turned down in 
September as the Indicator predicted it would. AD upward 
movement in the Indicator sipaled the decline should be a 
minor one. The prediction held true. 
1960 
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The Indicator turned downward as the averages start-
ed a decline. The next few montlul saw the Indicator aud aver-
ages move short distances up &Dd down. There was no major 
movement during this period. A decline was forecast by the 
Indicator in Augast. This decline became a reality. AD end 
of the year rise was forecast by the Indicator. This rise 
occurred aud continued well into 1961. 
1961 
The Indicator turned down during March as the aver-
ages moved higher. The averages started down in May, but the 
advauce continued from June to July. The decline from July 
to August was short aud the upward trend was re8UIIIed un·Ul 
December. The Indicator s.tarted up in September as the aver-
ages made their all time high in December aud turned down. 
1962 
The Indicator was pointing downward from March un-
til June. The market followed the same course. A reversal 
in the Indicator pointed to kl;ber prices. The market rose 
and then declined again until the end of October. The Indi-
cator confiDDed the decline aad also the rise that started 
in Oct.ober. 
Copclu!iop 
This Indicator has proved only fairly successful 
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as aa Indicator of short tena trends. The reason for this 
probably is the way it was' COIIplted. If it was compiled on 
a daily basis as opposed to a weekly basis, the results would 
have been more rewardin1. 
This Indicator should not be used as a short term 
Indicator when compiled weekly. CD a daily basis the Indi-
cator should lead rather than confirm the movements in the 
averages. This would make it valuable to the aualyst. ! 
confirmation that the movement is genuine, after it has hap-
peaed, does the trader little good. 
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CHAPTER XVI 
BARRON'S CONFIDENCE INDEX 
Backe;roUDd 
The Index is computed and published by Barron's 
each week and may be foUDd in their "Market Laboratory Sec-
tion". The Index is the ratio of the yield on Barron's 
highest grade bonds to the yield on the Dow-Jones 40 Bond 
Average. It measures the sentiment of the so called "smart 
money" or better informed investors who buy bonds. Under 
normal circumstances, when confidence in the future of busi-
ness is high, these investors are willing to buy the more 
speculative average grade bonds with a little better yield. 
This raises the price of the bonds, thus lowering the yield. 
As the yield declines, it comes closer to the yield on high 
grade bonds reducing the difference and, therefore, raising 
the Index. But when confidence is low, they buy high grade 
bonds, thus forcing the price of high grade bonds up and 
lowering their yield. As the yield becomes smaller, the 
difference between tha yields on high grade and average grade 
bonds becomes greater. As the difference becomes greater, 
the Index goes down.41 
A word of caution is in order here. Since the 
Index is dependent on the events of the bond market, the 
41Granville, p. 102. 
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Index will become distorted when the confidence in bonds as 
an investment medium is shaken or when the policy of the 
banking institutions change. Another reason for a distorted 
or hard to understand signal is that both the Dow Jones Bonds 
and Barron's Highest Grade Bonds include, among other bonds, 
different bonds of the same corporation. 
The Index has been published by Barron's since 
January 8, 1932. It has been widely used as a stock market 
forecaster only since 1959. "The first public revelation 
of its stock market correlation occurred in the E. F. Hatton 
and Company market letters in 1959".42 These letters are 
written by Joseph E. Granville. Barron's Confidence Index 
is included in Charts VII through x. 
Significance Of Movements 
"The flow of smart money shows up in the bond market 
before the stock market" .43 A series of advances means that 
the stock market is due to go higher while a series of declines 
means that the stock market is due to go lower. 
A specified time limit that the averages should 
follow the Index should not be used. The lag between the 
Index and the averages has varied over the years. The 1m-
portant point is that whatever is predicted by the Index 
should be expected to happen at any time. 
42Ibid., p. 101 
-
43!!!.!.!!.' p. 102 
Recently the Indicator Digest has determined that 
during 1962 the Index performed very well on the basis of a 
two week time lag between the Index and the averages. This 
is evident on Chart XIV. 
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Joseph E. Granville set forth several rules for 
interpreting the movements of this Index. The important 
points are that the Index is used to predict the timing and 
direction of the market and not the degree of the move. A 
decline is signaled when the Index aakes a sharp rise to a 
new high and then suffers an equally sharp decline the follow-
ing week. A rise is indicated when the Index turns upward.44 
AnalY!is of P!ft Results 
1939 
In March the Index siiDaled a fall in prices by 
startin& a decline. The actual decline started on the same 
day in both the Index and the averages. The middle part of 
the year saw the Index still heading lower while the averages 
were moving higher. The eventual decline in prices was 
signaled by a sharp drop in the Index before the averages 
turned down. 
1940 
The downward trend continued in both the Index and 
the averages. In May the Index hit bott011 and tamed up. By 
44Ibid., pp. 122- 123. 
-
June a definite signal had been given that the market would 
go ap. The averages performed on schedule as they started 
up shortly after the signal was given. A declining trend 
in the Index was evident toward the end of the year. This 
signaled the fall in prices. 
1941 
A trend upward began during the beginning of the 
year. This movement predicted that the averages would rise. 
They did rise sevecal months later. The upward trend in the 
Index turned around and headed downward around the middle of 
the year. The market finished its advance and declined as 
predicted. 
1942 
A rise in the Index began at the very end.of 1941 
and continued three months in 1942. This predicted the rise 
in the market. The Index started to turn down after its rise 
but the decline did not get very far. The rest of the year 
saw the Index moving slightly higher. Daring this time the 
market ended its decline as predicted and started its long 
climb upward. 
1943 
The Index signaled a correction in the market during 
the middle of the year. Prices declined slowly until December. 
1944 
The Index started upward during the end of 1943 
and continued to rise throuJboat the year. Prices followed 
the pattern predicted by the Index. 
1945 
Prices aoved with the Index right through the year. 
1946 
Daring the first part of the year the Index declin-
ed, predicting the end of the long rise. Later the Index 
started to rise again. This was the prediction that prices 
would stage another rally. The decline from this last rise 
by the Index signaled trouble for the rest of the year and 
into 1947. The action of the market followed the predictions 
of the Index. 
1947 
The Index rose during the early part of 1;he year 
signaling rising prices in the future. Prices rose for three 
months after the Index stopped rising. The Index then de-
clined signaling lower prices. !be market again declined right 
on schedule. During the rest of the year the Index climbed 
higher slowly. This signaled '$he rise in 1948. 
1948 
After the Index rose during the early part of the 
year, it moved in a sideways direction. The market concluded 
its rise by the middle of the year and started down. This 
downward movement in the market was not predicted by the 
Index. 
1949 
The Index finally started downward and continued 
in this direction until the end of September. The averages 
moved lower until July when they started upward. The Index 
started ap in October after the averages had already began 
their climb. This was a late sigaal. 
1950 
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The rise in the Index continued for the first half 
of the year. It then turned down as the averages did the 
same. The Index tamed ap several weeks later as the averages 
followed along shortly after. The Index and prices rose for 
the rest of the year. 
1951 
The Index turned down daring the middle of the year 
predicting falling prices. Prices declined slightly along 
with the Index. The end of the year saw the Index and the 
averages rising together. 
1952 
The Index rose throa&hoat the entire year. Prices 
moved in an upward direction with several periods of slowly 
declining movements. 
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1953 
The Index continued to rise until the middle of the 
year when it turned down forecasting lower prices. Prices 
started their decline before the Index. Prices turned up 
towards the end of the year. The Index moved sideways. This 
would have to be classified as a bad signal by the Index. 
1954 
Prices continued their upward trend throughout the 
entire year. The Index finally moved slowly upward. 
1955 
The Index made a new high during February and moved 
lower during the rest of the year. Prices moved up for the 
better part of the year until September when they suffered 
a reaction, but it was quickly reversed. This was not a good 
year for the Index. 
1956 
The Index rose durin& the early part of the year 
confirming the advance in prices that occurred in February 
and March. The Indicator declined after April signaling 
falling prices. The averages declined shortly afterwards 
and they rose for a short period before declining again. 
1957 
The Indicator started to rise in April and May 
but turned sharply downward after Yay. This action predicted 
the rising market during the first half of the year would 
turn down. This is exactly what happened. 
1958 
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A rise in prices was forecast by the Indicator 
because it started upward at the start of the year. During 
the second half of the year, the Index started a sharp decline 
and then resumed its upward move. The decline predicted the 
te.porary reaction in January and February of 1959. The 
upward movement in the Index indicated that the decline would 
only be a reaction and that prices would rise again. 
1959 
The averages rose after the reaction as predicted 
by the Index. Another reaction was predicted as the Index 
declined at the beginning of the year. The averages declined 
and started upward again as the Index also resumed its upward 
movement. The decline in the averages that came in August 
was forecast by the previous fall in the Index. The upward 
movement in the averages was called for by the rise in the 
index after the middle of the year. The Index dropped sharply 
after its rise. This was a prediction of the decline in 1960. 
1960 
The Index rose slightly indicating a mild rally 
could be anticipated later on in the year. The rally in 
stock prices took place before the middle of the year. The 
declining trend in the Index forecast the further decline 
in the averages. The Index moved upward at the end of the 
year forecasting the rising prices that occurred from Novem-
ber, 1960, to May, 1961. 
1961 
A small decline was evident in the Index after the 
start of the year. This was a prediction of a mild reaction 
before the middle of the year. The Index started to rise 
again and made a high before the middle of the year. After 
this high, the Index declined until the end of the year. 
The brief rallies in the Index during this declining move-
ment signaled the advances made in the averages. The Index 
was in a declining trend throughout the year while the aver-
ages were in an advancing trend. This was a danger signal. 
1962 
The Index continued a rise started at the end of 
1961. The Index made its top and started downward in March 
signaling the actual crash of 1962. As is evident from Chart 
XIV, the Index worked remarkably well during 1962 if the 
lead time was shortened to two weeks. This, of course, was 
purely hindsight, but it does show that no set rules as to 
the amount of lag time between the Index and the averages can 
be used. The upward movement after the June lows was pre-
dicted as well as the rise in OCtober. 
1963 
At the present time it looks as if a decline may 
have been predicted by the Index since it backed down from 
a high of 87.2 on January 21, 1963. This occurred after a 
sharp recent rise in the Index. 
Conclusion 
This Index seems to be very reliable in pinpoint-
ing the exact timing of short term fluctuations and also 
longer term highs and lows. This Indicator should be con-
sulted whenever a prediction as to the future direction of 
the market is to be made. 
90 
CHAPTEB XVII 
FUNDAMENTAL INDICATORS 
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There are many indicators, which are not based upon 
stock market transactions, used to predict or confirm a move-
ment in prices. The various agencies of the United States 
Government publish a wide variety of these figures. This 
section will be concerned with two of the less popular ones. 
They are the Sales/Inventory Ratio and the Scrap Steel Indi-
cator. The major indicators do not need to be charted by the 
individual because they are so widely publicized in the major 
periodicals. 
These fundamental indicators are reflections on the 
state of business. Since no rise in prices can continue when 
business indicators are declining, they should be followed. 
The same would be true of a tall in prices. 
Inventory/Sales Ratio 
The figures tor this Indicator can be found in 
the Survey ot Current Business published by the United States 
Department of Commerce. The figure that is available is two 
months old. The Indicator is comprised of the monthly ratio 
ot wholesale durable inventory divided by sales for the same 
category. 
When the Inventory/Sales Ratio starts downward from 
a high level, then a rise in prices is forecast. When the 
Ratio s'tar'ts upward from a low level, 'then prices can be 
expected 'to fall. 
The figures are plotted on Chart I. They go back 
as far as 1955. This was the first year that they were made 
available by the Department of Commerce. This Indicator was 
originally introduced as a stock market indicator by the 
Indicator Digest. 
Analysis of Past Besul'ts 
The Indicator started upward during 1956. This 
signaled that there would be a decline in the economy and 
also the stock market within several months. This proved 
accurate as prices declined in 1957 right on schedule. 
The Indicator commenced a decline which signaled 
a rise in prices which had just begun. 
An upward movement was evident in 'the Indicator 
during 1960. This sign predicted the fall in prices during 
the year. 
A decline in the Indicator during 1961 served to 
confirm the rise during that period. 
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The decline in prices during 1962 were not forecast 
by the Indicator as it continued downward. 
Conclusion 
The brief chart shows that the Indicator had work-
ed very well from 1956 through 1960. The Indicator gave a 
signal too late in 1961 and none at all in 1962. It has not 
been effective recently. A longer period of time should be 
observed. The Indicator should be plotted regularly, but 
unless a definite signal is given, it should be disregarded. 
Scrap Steel lpdicator 
This Indicator recently came to the public's atten-
tion when an article appeared in the October 8, 1962, issue 
of Barron's. The price of scrap steel is the figure that is 
plotted. The reason that the price of scrap steel can be 
used as a forecaster of future stock market movements is be-
cause the price of scrap steel is determined by the demand 
.tor this metal. When demand is high and the price rises, 
than it is an indication that the outlook for business is 
good. The steel plants will buy more scrap steel to melt 
down if they think business will pick up because of an increase 
in orders. As demand for scrap steel falls, the price goes 
down; this reflects the pessimistic outlook by the steel 
companies. There are other factors that may effect the price 
of scrap steel. The change in price due to these events should 
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be discounted. A steel worker's strike or a threat of a 
steel worker's strike is just such an event. The figures 
are available in the American Metal Market, a publication of 
the industry.45 The author of the article set up a rule to 
follow when using this Indicator. "While this technique is 
not perfect, when scrap prices drop 10 per cent, I'm selling". 46 
This seems like a reasonable guide. Chart XV is the scrap Steel 
Indicator. 
Analysis of Past Results 
The Indicator turned down before the stock market 
suffered its severe decline. The brief rebound in the stock 
market occurred at the same time as the Indicator advanced. 
The next upward move came in 1933 as the Indicator 
started upward confirming the rise that had started in the 
averages. 
The market and the Indicator dropped at the same 
time. The probable reason for no advance warning was the 
steel strike during May and June of 1937 which caused prices 
to rise longer than they normally would. 
45Blaine K. McKee, "Market Indicator", Barron's, 
(October 8, 1962), p. 9. 
46Ibid., p. 15. 
-
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A rise in prices was signaled in 1939 and 1940 as 
the Indicator rose sharply. The rise was halted by the ceil-
ing set on prices by the Office of Price Administration in 
1941 • 
.wz 
The Indicator shot upward during 1946 and 1947. 
This was a direct result of the lifting of the price ceiling. 
By 1949 the prices had adjusted themselves back to 
no~al. A rise started to develop during the middle of the 
year confirming the increase in the averages. The Indicator 
continued to rise with the averages. The Korean War brought 
price control and this Indicator became useless. After the 
War demand for scrap steel declined and the price of scrap 
steel sank. 
The price of scrap steel began to rise several months 
after the stock market commenced its rise. The decline in 
prices of scrap steel in early part of 1956 was due to the 
steel strike. 
The decline in the averages was forecast when scrap 
steel prices declined from an all time high at the end of 1956. 
The price of scrap steel rose after the increase 
in the averages had started upward, confirming this upward 
movement. The Indicator started to decline in the early part 
of 1959 forecasting a decline in the stock market. The aver-
ages started their decline shortly thereafter. The Indicator 
turned upward along with the averages after the middle of the 
year. 
The Indicator declined from the beginning of the 
year and prices followed along. By the end of the year, 
prices started to move higher. This rise in prices was con-
firmed several months later as the Indicator started to rise. 
The Indicator dropped sharply at the beginning of 
the year predicting the decline several months later. 
The price of scrap steel has risen very little from 
its low of 1962, thus it is not predicting a major rise in 
the stock market. 
Conclusion 
This Indicator has proved more useful in predict-
ing a decline than in forecasting an advance. As an indicator 
of future movements in the stock market, the non-business 
influences on the Indicator must be realized and discounted. 
The Indicator should be used in the future to determine when 
the market is due for a decline. 
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CHAPTER XVIII 
CONCLUSION 
There are indicators that the average investor can 
compile to help select an appropriate time to purchase or 
dispose of equities. After reviewing the analysis sections 
of each of the preceding chapters. it is evident that not all 
the indicators will predict the movements in advance. Some 
indicators are used to confirm the movement after is has ac-
tually began. A signal is given by the indicator when it re-
acts a certain way. The prediction is based on what has hap-
pened to the stock market whenever this indicator reacted 
similarly in the past. 
Each indicator is of little value when used by it-
self. In order to be useful. the indicators should be com-
bined into a group and a signal should be obtained from the 
action of the group. Chart XIII is a reprint of the "com-
posit Indicator Index" of the Indicator Digest .47 It shows 
how their predictions based upon a group of indicators would 
have turned out. The reader should realize that these results 
are based upon the firm's own methods of interpreting each in-
dicator and could reflect some element of hindsight. Their 
record• nevertheless. is quite impressive. 
The future use of indicators to predict the move-
ment in the stock market may not achieve the past degree of 
47The Indicator Digest. (November 6. 1962) p. 8. 
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accuracy. This is because the indicators are attracting an 
increasing number of followers. The effectiveness of the 
indicator is diminished when its following is increased.48 
There are no indicators or series of indicators that will en-
able the investor to buy at the bottom and sell at the top 
of each long term movement. This is because conditions pre-
sent at each turning point are different. If such a method 
was available, it would be rendered useless because everyone 
would use it. There has to be sell orders to match against 
buy order, and if everyone wanted to buy when no one wanted 
to sell, there would be no market. 
Table I contains the predictions of the long term 
indicators for the period covered in this thesis. The next 
section of this chapter is an analysis of the long term indi-
cators as a group. 
Before making investment decisions, the individual 
investor should evaluate as much of the financial information 
that is available along with the t'.orecast or the technical 
indicators. It should be remembered that the indicators 
represent only one portion of the factors that should be con-
sidered bef~re a final investment decision is made. The pur-
chase or sale of a certain stock may result in a loss even 
though the indicators forecast higher prices. Every stock 
does not enjoy a price rise or decline at the same time. As 
4BBenjamin Graham et al. Security Analysis (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1962) p. 716. 
a result, the different stocks under consideration should 
be evaluated before an investment decision is made. 
Analysis of Results of the Indicators as a Group 
1942 
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The bullish indicators were the Advance-Decline 
Line, the High-Low Index, the Yield Cycle, the Odd Lot Trad-
ing Ratio, the Odd Lot Balance Index, the Odd Lot Short Sales 
Index, Barron's Confidence Index, and the Scrap Steel Indica-
tor. At this time there were no bearish indicators. A very 
definite bullish signal was given during 1942 and prices rose. 
1946 
All the indicators had turned bearish at some time 
during the year, signaling a decline in prices. The market 
ended its rising trend and turned down around the middle of 
the year. 
1947 
The Short Interest Ratio, the Odd Lot Trading Ratio, 
the Odd Lot Shor·t Sales Index, and the Scrap Steel Index turned 
bullish during the year. At the beginning of 1948, the High 
Low Index and the Odd Lot Balance Index turned bullish. Dar-
ing this time the Advance-Decline Line, the Low Priced Stock 
Index, the Yield Cycle, the Debit Balances and the Credit 
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Balances remained bearish. A weak bullish indication was 
predicted as the majority of the indicators were bullish. 
The prediction was reversed shortly afterward as all the in-
dicators turned bearish with the exception or the Odd Lot 
Trading Ratio and the scrap Steel Indicator. This combina-
tion or a bullish and a bearish signal did not produce any 
great profits or losses as the market fluctuated in a narrow 
range. 
1949 
All the indicators pointed to higher prices except 
the .Low Priced Stock Index, which conti~ed during 1950. 
This is the normal way a bull market gets started. The mar-
ket rose as predicted. 
1952 
Between the end ot 1952 and the beginning ot 1953, 
the following indicators had turned from bullish to bearish: 
The High-Low Index, the Short Interest Ratio, the Low Priced 
Stock Index, the Odd Lot Trading Ratio, the Odd Lot Short Sales 
Index, the Credit Balances, and the Debit Balances. This group 
of bearish indicators was more than enough to issue a bearish 
signal. A decline took place in the market during 1953. 
1953 
The indicators reversed their previous bearish signal 
at the end ot the year. They gave a unanimous bullish prediction 
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as 1954 got underway. Prices rose in response to the bullish 
forecast. 
1955 
A bearish signal was evident as the Advance-Decline 
Line, the High-Low Index, the Short Interest Batio, the Odd 
Lot Trading Ratio, the Odd Lot Balance Index, the Credit Bal-
ances, and the Debit Balances gave bearish signals during the 
year. The market rose slightly higher during 1956, bat the 
major rise had been completed. 
1958 
Daring the year all the indicators gave a bullish 
signal and the market rose. 
1959 
The previous bullish signal was reversed daring the 
year pointing to lower prices ahead. The market declined and 
then recovered to its previous high point before declining 
further daring 1960. 
1961 
The indicators were divided as to the prediction 
of 1961. The averages rose to a new all time high during the 
year, bat the stocks that make up the market did not enjoy 
such a rise. 
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1962 
By the beginning of the year all the indicators had 
become bearish with the exception of the Odd Lot Balance Index 
and the Inventory/Sales Ratio. These bearish indicators should 
have warned investors that there would be a decline in prices 
of stocks during the year. The "crash" of 1962 is history. 
The sharp rebound in prices after their decline was not pre-
dicted by the indicators as the large advance took place in 
such a short period of time. 
1963 
The future, as predicted by the indicators during 
January, should see a rise in prices. The Odd Lot Balance 
Index, the Short Interest Ratio, the Odd Lot Trading Ratio, 
the Debit Balances, the Odd Lot Short Sales Index, the Advance-
Decline Line, the Low Priced Stock Index, and the High-Low 
Index are all giving bullish signals. 
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